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Advocacy Under Islam and               
Common Law 
God means no injustice to any of  His creatures.* 
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article demonstrates that advocacy arose as a reformist doctrine 
under both Islamic and common law traditions.  Reformist advocacy 
fights laws with laws.  In this fight, both traditions require that the 
advocates striving for justice be courageous but courteous.  The advocates 
must be courageous to challenge power-based injustices.  They must be 
courteous because aggressive manners are not essential to effective 
advocacy.  For a variety of reasons, reformist advocacy has lost its way 
in both traditions.  Advocacy in the United States has turned to manipulation 
whereas advocacy in the Islamic tradition has embraced militancy.  At a 
time when America and Islam are engaged in an epic struggle to influence 
each other, this study illuminates advocacy values they share and critical 
distinctions they draw in the enforcement of advocacy ethics. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article compares the concepts of advocacy under Islamic and 
common law traditions.  In both traditions, advocacy arose as a reformist 
doctrine.  It was a zealous calling to subvert the establishment of wrongs, 
and dismantle hardships inflicted on the powerless and the outcast.  
When a system is unjust, advocacy can be a sturdy shield to defend its 
victims.1  Reformist advocacy aims at curbing gross violations of “dignity 
that God has conferred on the children of Adam.”2  It challenges the 
laws of ignorance that deny personal freedoms and the normalcy of life.  
Reformist advocacy undermines lawless or law-based injustices.  It fights 
laws with laws, supporting fairness and equity.  In the United States, for 
 
 1. See generally E. W. Timberlake, Jr., Origin and Development of Advocacy as 
a Profession, 9 VA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1922) (explaining that “from time immemorial,” the 
principle of advocacy has been critical to the administration of justice). 
 2. QURAN, sura al-Isra 17:70.  Please note that the translation of the Quran 
throughout this Article is the Author’s translation unless otherwise noted. 
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example, the people’s lawyers combat social injustice through advocacy.3  
Academic writings remind lawyers that “ethical speech in law, . . . can, . . . 
forge bonds of shared struggle.”4 
For a variety of reasons, advocacy as a doctrine of justice is losing its 
way in both traditions.  In common law, zealous advocacy, frequently 
associated with clientelism,5 has degenerated into manipulation.  Clientelism 
thrives on the partisan passion to bend statutes, cases, and other legal 
materials, substantive and procedural, to advance client-serving claims 
of facts and law.  Postmodernist epistemological discomfort with the 
notions of truth, virtue, justice, and knowledge create and legitimize 
relativism6 under which self interest is touted as the reigning paradigm.  
In Islam, advocacy has turned to militancy to enforce the rule of the 
Basic Code—the Quran and the Sunna.  This militancy, however, has 
evolved out of rigid historical modes of obedience to rulers and 
adherence to classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).7  Manipulation and 
militancy—both forms of advocacy—have damaged the reputation of 
their respective legal traditions.  Yet popular and professional tolerance 
for manipulation in common law jurisdictions and for militancy in 
Muslim countries continues to assure the longevity of these forms of 
advocacy. 
A comparative study of advocacy under Islam and common law might 
be dismissed as an odd comparison.  A religious tradition, one might 
argue, cannot be compared with a secular tradition.  This argument is 
meritless.  The discussion below will demonstrate that the two traditions, 
though one religious and the other secular, support the same core ethics 
that constitute advocacy as a doctrine of justice.  Furthermore, the two 
traditions came in close contact during the reign of the British Empire.8  
 
 3. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2004) 
(distinguishing between legal aid lawyers and public interest lawyers). 
 4. Robin West, Speech, Silence, and Ethical Lives in the Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1397, 1397 (2007). 
 5. Clientelism here means a law practice devoted exclusively to protecting the 
interests of clients without regard to the justice or morality of these interests.  In political 
literature, clientelism refers to powerful patrons who promise favors to “clients” in 
exchange for votes. 
 6. Henry G. Hultquist, Legal Philosophy and a Postmodernist Fallacy, 2 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 223, 236 (1995) (discussing postmodernist notions of philosophy). 
 7. See Ali Khan, The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Islamic 
Ijtihad, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 341, 341 (2004). 
 8. See David Bonderman, Modernization and Changing Perceptions of Islamic 
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (1968) (explaining the Western influence on Islamic law). 
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In this period, the law-based technical skills of advocacy were imparted 
to numerous legal systems in the Muslim world.9  Professor John 
Makdisi provides credible evidence to demonstrate that the common law 
of England itself “could be the true offspring of Islamic law,” particularly in 
adopting a rational civil procedure and trial by jury.10 
In the common law tradition, American ethics for advocacy also had 
religious roots.  These ethics were drawn from the scholarship of Professor 
George Sharswood11 who “relied heavily on scriptural teachings and 
moral principles as a basis for [his] work.”12  A regular reader of the 
Greek Testament, Sharswood saw inseparable bonds between law and 
religion.  “The law of a country is the school of its morality,” he preached in 
one of his lectures.13  Sharswood’s Essay on Professional Ethics14 also 
played a central role in the drafting of the first ABA code of professional 
responsibility in 1908.15  Historically, therefore, American ethics for 
lawyers are anchored in religious sensibilities. 
 
 9. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1026–27 
(1991) (observing the Western-style legal training in law schools in Muslim countries).  See 
also Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use 
of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 67, 67 (2006) (“[T]here may be as much the same as is different between the 
jurisprudence of Islam and the United States.”). 
 10. John A Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
1635, 1695–96 (1999). 
 11. George Sharswood (1810–1883) served both as the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and as a professor of law at the University of 
Pennsylvania.  The Legal Education of George Sharswood (1810–1883): An Excerpt 
from his Manuscript Family Memoranda in the Hampton L. Carlson Collection of the 
Free Library of Philadelphia, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 259, 259–60 (Howell J. Heaney ed., 
1958).  His major works include George Sharswood, Introductory Lecture on the Aims 
and Duties of the Profession of the Law, Address at the Opening of the 1854 Session at 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law (Oct. 1854).  Edwin R. Keedy, George 
Sharswood—Professor of Law, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 692 (1950).  Sharswood read the 
Greek Testament on a regular basis and discussed its nuances with a clerical friend.  At 
his death, a copy of the Greek Testament was found upon the couch.  Id. at 693. 
 12. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 891 So. 2d 848, 861 (Ala. 2004).  See also 
Justice Hugh Maddox, Lawyers: The Aristocracy of Democracy or “Skunks, Snakes, and 
Sharks”?, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 329 (1999). 
 13. George E. Wickersham, Judge Sharswood, Address Before the Sharswood 
Law Club of the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 22, 1914), in 62 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 
617 (1914). 
 14. HON. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed., Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1884). 
 15. H.M.B, Note and Comment, The Proposed Code of Legal Ethics for the 
American Bar Association, 6 MICH. L. REV. 318, 319 (1908).  The copies of the Essay 
were distributed to the ABA members.  In 1887, however, the Alabama State Bar 
Association was the first American organization to author a code of ethics for lawyers, a 
code founded substantially on Sharswood’s ethics.  Id. 
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This comparative study aims at building understanding between the 
United States and the Muslim world.16  “For the most part the brilliant 
legal heritage of the Muslims,” wrote Donald Marquardt more than fifty 
years ago, “has remained a closed subject to by far the majority of 
students of American law.”17  Lack of familiarity with Islam, which 
continues, does not deter intellectuals and policymakers from advocating 
erroneous assumptions about Islam.18  Advocates of war on terrorism 
have generated extensive literature that presents Islam as an intrinsically 
violent religion.19  Negative images of America proliferate in the Muslim 
world, and vice versa.20  American and Islamic legal traditions, which 
remained alien to each other for centuries, and despite huge differences 
in their roots and branches, are now engaged in an epic struggle to 
influence each other.21  Like opposing counsels in a hotly-contested 
case, advocates for America and Islam22 accuse each other of foul play.23  
Mutual fear and suspicion mar meaningful conversations.24  This Article 
shows that both Anglo-American and Islamic legal traditions have been 
 
 16. See generally Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial 
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 n.1 (1996) (recognizing that Islam is now the 
second largest faith in the United States); James C.N. Paul, Islam and the State: The 
Problems of Establishing Legitimacy and Human Rights, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1057, 
1058 (1991) (mentioning the diversity of Muslims across continents and subcontinents). 
 17. Donald E. Marquardt, Law in the Middle East, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1350 
(1956) (book review). 
 18. IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 12 (2000) (“In a 
recent American poll, over half the respondents described Islam as inherently anti-
American, anti-Western, or supportive of terrorism—though only five per cent of those 
surveyed said they had much contact with Muslims personally.”). 
 19. Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 47, 48–49 
(2006) (examining the literature that presents Islam as an intrinsically violent religion). 
 20. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our 
Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1220 (2007) (reporting cases where critics of Islam have 
been prosecuted under hate law crimes and arguing that hate speech prosecutions inhibit 
public debate about the relationship between terrorism and Islamic radicalism). 
 21. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988 (2002) (arguing that the 
United States must not allow the war on terrorism to be defined as the West against 
Islam); Amartya Sen, Op-Ed., A World Not Neatly Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, 
at A39 (criticizing the viewpoint of clash of civilizations between Islam and the West). 
 22. See generally Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullas on a Bus: The Establishment 
Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid, 95 GEO. L.J. 171, 172–73 (2006) (analyzing whether the 
U.S. promotion of moderate Islam in Muslim countries is consistent with the 
Establishment Clause). 
 23. L. ALI KHAN, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 133–71 (2006). 
 24. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1582 
(2002) (arguing that the American public is being instructed to profile a Muslim citizen 
as a terrorist). 
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highly sophisticated in supporting advocacy as a doctrine of justice.  
And both traditions must save this doctrine from distortions that have 
corroded the doctrine’s normative foundation.  This comparative study 
will hopefully provide insights into jurisprudential recesses of each tradition.  
It might also inform lawyers, judges, and academics of the two traditions, 
possibly generating mutual respect and learning. 
II.  BASICS OF ADVOCACY 
This section furnishes the basics of advocacy to highlight two 
important points.  The first point explains litigation advocacy in the 
common law, known as khusuma in Islamic law.  The second point 
emphasizes the distinction between advocacy demeanor and advocacy 
substance.  These points facilitate the understanding of comparative 
conceptions of advocacy in Islamic and common law traditions. 
Advocacy shares space with rhetoric, persuasion, knowledge, reasoning, 
marketing, incivility, and aggression.  Advocacy may be taught and 
employed in numerous legal and non-legal contexts.25  In religion, missionary 
advocacy spreads a faith and recruits new believers.  Evangelical advocacy 
has been even more aggressive in spreading the faith it preaches.  In politics, 
campaigning for a political office involves advocacy with voters.  
Lobbyists and pressure groups advocate, appealing to the legislature, for 
and against the enactment of specific laws.  In private matters, one may 
advocate for receiving a favorable will from a testator.  The advocacy of 
one’s interests in contract negotiations, including labor and employment 
contracts, is often necessary.26  In the United States, even advocacy of 
the use of force or law violation is tolerated under the Constitution, 
provided such advocacy is not directed to inciting imminent lawless 
action.27  These and other public and private activities involve highly 
specialized advocacy skills. 
A.  Litigation Advocacy 
In law, advocacy is often identified with litigation advocacy where 
lawyers contest partisan viewpoints before juries and judges for client-
serving outcomes.  In offering legal services, lawyers play several roles 
 
 25. Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy 
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 117 (2006) (observing that law schools do not 
sufficiently teach oral advocacy). 
 26. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 654 
(2001) (hoping that a legal framework can be imagined that promotes justice, equality, 
dignity, and fairness in the emerging workplace). 
 27. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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that may or may not require advocacy.  Lawyers advise clients.  They 
construct and execute transactions.  They prevent and minimize disputes.  
American academic literature characterizes the lawyer, “as a counselor, 
planner, drafter, negotiator, investigator, lobbyist, scapegoat, champion, 
and, . . . a friend.”28  In litigation advocacy, however, lawyers clash with 
lawyers to produce favorable outcomes for clients.  Advocacy exists, writes 
Aristotle, “to affect the giving of decisions.”29  In this sense, lawyers are 
professional persuaders.30 
Persuasion is not exclusively oral.31  In law, advocacy includes written 
materials, such as memoranda and briefs.  Persuasive writing is as vital, 
if not more, to the outcome of cases as is oral advocacy.  Advocacy 
skills in writing are not the same as in oral speech, a fact that Aristotle 
notes with splendid insights.32 
Litigation advocacy is dispute oriented.  The existence of a dispute—
wherein parties may have competing versions of facts, competing cases 
and statutes applicable to issues, competing claims and counterclaims, 
and may vie for different outcomes and remedies—is the sine quo non of 
litigation advocacy.  The dispute, factual and legal, is often complex to invite 
litigation.  In some cases, parties may agree on facts but not on laws.  In 
all cases, however, litigation advocacy presupposes a weighty dispute, for 
no advocacy is necessary if contentions are inconsequential.  Litigation 
advocacy is thus a method of resolving complex and contentious 
disputes.  While in small claims courts parties themselves may fight their 
cases, most complex cases are contested with the help of lawyers. 
 
 28. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 242 (1984). 
 29. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 622 (Robert 
Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1987). 
 30. Celia W. Childress, The Trial Lawyer’s Persuasive Speaking Voice, in 81 AM. 
JUR. Trials 317, at § 19 (2001).  Advocacy is not an end in itself, nor is it coterminous 
with any or all means of influence.  In courts of law, for example, advocacy is a means to 
obtain favorable judgments from lay and professional judges.  However, not all means to 
obtain favorable judgments are ethical.  Any appeal to ethnic, racial, national origin, 
tribal, caste, or any such relational sentiments with juries and judges constitutes unlawful 
advocacy.  Any such proposed solidarity generates prejudices and undermines the 
principle that all parties to litigation must be treated with equal respect. 
 31. ARISTOTLE, supra note 29, § 1414a, at 666–67. 
 32. Id. at 256.  A client may therefore need two advocates, one skilled in writing 
and the other in oral speech.  Modern law firms involve several advocates in a lawsuit, 
thus combining their writing and oral skills for a greater impact on the audience. 
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The common law ethics literature supports the view that the lawyer’s 
responsibility is multidimensional.33  The lawyer’s responsibility towards 
the client is the most obvious.  The lawyer engaged in protecting the 
client’s interests is simultaneously obligated to protect the spirit of the 
legal profession, respect for courts, and public interest in maintaining a 
just system.34  The obligation to protect public interest may or may not 
be synonymous with that of protecting state interest.  In apartheid South 
Africa, for example, the lawyer’s obligation to uphold state interest 
meant perpetuation of injustice.  When a state takes away the people’s 
fundamental rights, the lawyer’s obligation to promote justice trumps his 
obligation to protect state interests.  In unjust legal systems, reformist 
lawyers are “subversive.”35  They look into the “face of the power of the 
state”36 and subvert state sponsored injustices. 
Reformist advocacy, though it promotes social responsibility, is not 
opposed to individual rights: It protects them.  Universal individual rights 
and freedoms are great contributions to the unfolding of human 
civilization.37  The rise of individualism has weakened, if not demolished, 
patriarchic conceptions of social order.  It freed members of the household 
from the oppressive doctrine of Patria Potestas, a social aggregation 
practiced under Roman and German laws, which subordinated children 
and servants to powers of the patriarch.38  Individualism is incompatible 
with the caste system that suppresses members of lower castes to 
perpetual degradation.39  Individual rights also dismantle racism, a social 
structure that first identifies individuals as members of a racial group 
and then attributes superiority or inferiority to the entire group, unjustly 
allocating social benefits and burdens.  Likewise, individual rights 
challenge gender oppression, which associates questionable attributes to 
 
 33. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
138 (1998) (arguing that a basic goal of ethics is to promote justice); Robert W. Gordon, 
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7, 10 (1988) (defining independence of 
lawyers as distance from both the client and the state).  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF. 
CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983). 
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2007); MODEL RULES OF PROF. 
CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (1983). 
 35. Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language 
Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1084–86 (2006) (arguing that lawyers must immerse 
themselves in communities in authentic ways to represent them most effectively). 
 36. These multidimensional responsibilities are vividly articulated in COUNCIL OF 
BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS 
pmbl. 1.1 (2006), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/2006_ 
code_enpdf1_1182240432.pdf. 
 37. L. ALI KHAN, A THEORY OF UNIVERSAL DEMOCRACY 81–112 (2003) (arguing 
that universal values are valid across religions and cultures). 
 38. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 109–65 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861). 
 39. Ali Khan, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289 (2001) 
(analyzing how different systems produce rigid social structures of manual labor). 
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women as a group and denies them their individuality.  Individual rights 
accord respect and dignity to the physical existence, intellect, emotions, 
and spirituality of each person.40 
In sum, advocacy in the chambers of a socially active bar is a 
transformative tool to remove social ills through the rule of law.  
Reformist advocacy engineers social relations toward justice and power-
driven relations away from oppression.  The more unjust the system, the 
more useful is reformist advocacy.  Advocacy in the service of public 
interests is markedly different from advocacy in the service of clients 
whose claims deepen inequities.  The universal right to representation 
assures legal services to all.  But it does not dilute the distinction 
between advocacy for a client’s narrow interests and advocacy for social 
equities.41  This distinction must not be lost in cynical Kelsenian obfuscation 
of a supposedly value-relative question: what is justice?42 
B.  Khusuma 
Khusuma, the most relevant concept of the Basic Code, furnishes a 
parallel to litigation advocacy.  It means adversarial argumentation.43  
The Quran mentions the concept in the following verse: “He (God) hath 
created man from a drop of fluid; yet . . . he (man) is an khaseemun 
mubeenun.”44  The word mubeenun means plain, clear, or evident.  
However, the word khassemun in the context of the verse poses some 
difficulty of interpretation.  Picktall translates khaseemun as opponent.45  
Yusuf Ali translates this word as disputer.46  Yet, Muhammad Asad, 
relying on the authority of past jurists, translates the phrase khaseemun 
mubeenun as a person endowed “with the power to think and to argue.”47  
Picktall and Yusuf Ali emphasize human arrogance in forgetting their 
 
 40. Id. at 341–55. 
 41. Book Note, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 1383 (2007) (reviewing KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW (2005)). 
 42. HANS KELSEN, What is Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE 24 (1957). 
 43. The words khusma and khaseemun are derived from the root khsm, which 
means adversary. 
 44. QURAN, sura an-Nahl 16:4. 
 45. QURAN, sura an-Nahl 16:4, in HOLY QURAN 280 (Marmaduke Pickthall trans., 
Taj Co. 1983). 
 46. QURAN, sura an-Nahl 16:4, in THE HOLY QUR-AN 656 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali 
trans., Ashraf Press 1969). 
 47. QURAN, sura an-Nahl 16:4, in THE MESSAGE OF THE QUR’ĀN 394 (Muhammad 
Asad trans., E. J. Brill 1980). 
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humble origin and embarking upon contentions.  Asad’s translation 
emphasizes God’s powers in turning a small particle of fluid into an 
intellectual and spiritual being that can think and argue to sort out 
confusions and disputes.  In either understanding, advocates fit the 
definition of khaseemun mubeenum—vivid adversaries. 
Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), a Muslim jurist and law professor, defines 
khusuma as a form of predatory argumentation aimed at depriving others 
of their rights or property.48  He opens the discussion of khusuma with 
the Prophet’s proverb that “the most hated person in the sight of [God] is 
al-khisam (a person who engages in khusuma).”49  In further explaining 
the meaning of khusuma, al-Ghazali uses the example of lawyers to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable khusuma.  Khusuma 
employed to fight for one’s rights and property, says al-Ghazali, cannot 
be condemned.50  Thus, lawyers may use their argumentative and 
adversarial skills to demand justice for their client.  However, any khusuma 
which exaggerate one’s claims or inflicts pain upon opponents is unethical.51  
At its extreme end, warns al-Ghazali, lawyers engaged in khusuma care 
less about the rights in dispute and more about hurting each other’s 
feelings, honor, and reputation.52  This belligerent use of khusuma is 
contrary to the Quran’s injunction: “speak unto all people in the best 
possible manner.”53  The Prophet himself never talked in an insulting 
manner, and instructed his followers in the following words: “The best 
among you are those who have the best manners and character.”54 
C.  Demeanor and Substance 
This Article builds upon a fundamental distinction between advocacy 
demeanor and advocacy substance.  Advocacy demeanor consists of a 
lawyer’s conduct in the course of litigation, including the use of 
respectful or rude language, pleasant or offensive gestures, bullying and 
intimidation of witnesses, contempt or courtesy toward opposing counsel, 
 
 48. See 3 ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI, REVIVAL OF RELIGIONS LEARNINGS (IHYA 
ULUM-ID-DIN) 97–98 (Fazl-Ul-Karim trans., Durul-Ishat 1993), available at http://www. 
ghazali.org/books/ihya-v3.pdf.  This book is one of the most influential in Islamic legal 
literature.  It consists of four volumes and has been translated in numerous languages, 
including English. 
 49. Id. at 190.  The hadith is authentic.  See 3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, The Book of 
Oppressions 43:637, at 381 (Dr. Muhammad Mushin Khan trans., Kazi Pubs. 1979). 
 50. 3 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 191. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:83; 3 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 191. 
 54. 8 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, § 73:222, at 142–43 (“The prophet was 
the best of all the people in character.”); 1 SAHIH MUSLIM, Kitab al-Salat 4:1388, at 386 
(Abdul Hamid Siddiqi trans., Kitab Bhaven 2000). 
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trust and mistrust of judges.  All these and other related behaviors constitute 
advocacy demeanor.55  Discussions about zealous advocacy frequently 
focus on a lawyer’s courtroom demeanor.  But advocacy demeanor is 
distinguishable from substantive zeal that lawyers employ to argue for 
clients’ best interests.  Substantive advocacy focuses on uses of law to 
obtain desired results.  It requires skills to distinguish cases and interpret 
statutes.  It requires knowledge to analyze moral and social dimensions 
of a case.  It requires vision to propose legal solutions.  Substantive advocacy 
may or may not be supplemented with an aggressive demeanor.  A 
lawyer may engage in substantive zeal with the kindest demeanor. 
Loud voice and theatrical rhetoric cannot defeat a respectful but steely 
mind determined to undo a manifest wrong.  In the United States, 
zealous advocacy is losing its moral momentum; it has been expelled 
from the text of numerous professional codes; and, it may be discarded 
as a professional ethic in the near future.56  This conspicuous decline 
is partly due to confusion between advocacy demeanor and advocacy 
substance and association of zealous advocacy with theatrical excesses. 
The distinction between demeanor and substance is not new.  Aristotle 
drew a similar distinction between personal and impersonal advocacy.57  
A good advocate combines the personal and impersonal factors of 
advocacy to demonstrate the case of his client.  The impersonal advocacy 
belongs to the extrinsic means of persuasion, which include evidence of 
witnesses, the application of laws, and contracts that litigants may have 
made, performed, or breached.  In modern language, the impersonal 
advocacy may simply be called competence.58  An incompetent lawyer 
will fail to be an effective advocate, no matter how good his speaking 
skills are.  Rules of professional responsibility first require that a lawyer 
have the requisite legal knowledge.59  Expert lawyers may master all 
nuances in some single area of law.  Nonetheless, good advocates are 
more than experts.  They possess a temporal wisdom of law.  They understand 
the spirit of laws they practice.  More importantly, they develop an intuitive 
 
 55. See W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
305, 305 (2001) (examining whether demands of civil speech from lawyers are consistent 
with the First Amendment). 
 56. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165–66 
(2006) (suggesting that professional zeal may have hit its peak in vigor one hundred 
years ago). 
 57. Aristotle, supra note 29, at bk. II, § 1375b. 
 58. Id. 
 59. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1984). 
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sense of how laws might develop in the future.  This temporal depth of 
law comes through legal knowledge, reflection, and experience of the 
real world in a dynamic context of time. 
In addition to expertise, case specific preparation is critical to advocacy.  
Sound expertise in an area of law, though necessary, is inadequate for 
effective advocacy.  Each case has its own facts, procedural history, issues, 
background dynamics, and party expectations.  An advocate not only 
learns these specific traits of a case, but she also develops a feel for the 
case and its potential possibilities and limits in pursuing appropriate 
legal remedies.  A mere mechanical understanding of the case does not 
lead to effective advocacy.60  A case must be understood as a living 
organism in the process of unfolding its fullness.  This profound understanding 
of a case requires thorough preparation and reflection.61  These micro 
skills are often indispensable to bringing about micro transformations, 
regardless of whether the legal system is predominantly secular or 
religious. 
III.  REFORMIST ORIGINS 
This section demonstrates that in both Islamic and common law 
traditions, the first calling of advocacy was iconoclastic.  It challenged 
false gods and their injustices.  In Islam, the doctrine of advocacy to 
undo wrongs is derived, in the seventh century, from the Quran’s 
teachings of tawakkul—the singular trust in God; a trust that nullifies 
loyalties to unjust families, unjust tribes, unjust customs, and to the era 
of ignorance.  In common law, the doctrine is derived, in the early 
nineteenth century, from the reformist movement in Great Britain, an 
Empire that practiced colonialism, slave trade, unfair labor practices, and 
other social ills at home and abroad.  Henry Brougham (1778–1868), a 
leader of the reformist movement, presented the concept of singular duty 
to undo these injustices, even if this duty clashes with loyalty to the 
royal family, the country, or to the British Empire.62  The iconoclastic 
teachings of singular trust and singular duty were derived from diverse 
sources, but their respective mission was no other but to empower 
advocacy for justice.  This empowerment was no license for incivility, 
abusive tactics, or violence.  It was aimed at bringing down false gods 
with the power of the pen and a trustworthy character. 
 
 60. Id. at R. 2.1. 
 61. Id. at R. 1.1. 
 62. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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A.  Singular Trust 
In the Islamic tradition, advocacy as a doctrine of justice did not arise 
in courts of law.  Nor was it ever granted exclusively to lawyers.  The 
Quran democratizes advocacy to strive for justice so that it reaches all 
believers, regardless of profession, gender, or social origin.  This 
democratization of advocacy is not tied to recruiting new believers.  It 
is tied to striving for social and economic justice.  The Quran establishes 
a competitive world of virtue (but a distributive world of goods) in 
which each individual strives to excel in piety—not wealth—to obtain 
nearness to God.63  Everyone contributes to the making of a world of 
virtue.  Justice-based advocacy is not merely verbal.  It is manual, it is 
speech, and it is mindset.  The Prophet is reported to have said: 
He who amongst you sees something abominable should modify it with the help 
of his hand; and if he has not strength enough to do it, then he should do it with 
his tongue; and if he has not strength enough to do it, (even) then he should 
(abhor it) from his heart, and that is the least of faith.64 
This expanded notion of advocacy derives its strength, as discussed 
below, from the teachings of tawakkul (singular trust in God). 
Singular trust is related to the classical Arabic word for lawyer—
wakeel—a word of the Quran.65  In its fuller meaning, wakeel means a 
trustee, guardian, fiduciary, representative, defender, and protector.  The 
client is known as mutawakel, a person who in the disposal of worldly 
affairs relies on the expertise, guidance, and sincerity of wakeel.  Al-
Ghazali explains that the relationship between wakeel and mutawakel is 
anchored in trust.66  This relationship of trust is possible only if wakeel 
has qualities that generate trust and mutawakel has the heart to trust.67  
An incompetent or devious wakeel, primarily interested in gathering 
fees, fails to beget trust.  But some clients have suspicious hearts.68  They 
 
 63. QURAN, sura al-Hujurat 49:13 (the most honored in the sight of God is the 
most righteous); Abdulaziz Sachedina, Guidance or Governance?  A Muslim Conception 
of “Two-Cities,” 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1090 (2000) (explaining the concept of 
competing with one another in good works). 
 64. 1 SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 54, Kitab Al-Iman 1:79, at 40. 
 65. The word wakeel (or vekil) is a pre-Quranic Arabic word.  The words wakeel 
and wakalat are derived from the stem wkl, which means to trust, appoint, authorize, 
empower, or put in charge. 
 66. 4 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 210–11, available at http://www.ghazali. 
org/books/ihya-v4.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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are untrusting.  They do not trust even if the wakeel has all the trustee’s 
qualities and is known to be reliable and protective.  Thus, trust is relational.  
Its strength lies in the client’s capacity to trust as much as it lies in the 
trustee’s trustworthiness.  This reciprocity of trust is the key to understanding 
the Quran’s teaching of singular trust. 
Furthermore, the word wakeel in its original meaning is completely 
positive; it carries no negative connotations as does the word lawyer.  In 
fact, al-Wakeel is one of God’s names.69  The word wakeel appears 
numerous times in the Quran, mostly associated with God and in 
instructions to the prophets.  In most verses, the Quran reminds believers 
that they take God alone, and no one else, as their wakeel.70  In some 
verses, God specifically instructs Prophet Muhammad that he tell the 
people that he is a messenger but not a wakeel.71  Jacob, in speaking to 
his sons,72 and Moses, in speaking to the Children of Israel,73 both make 
the same confession that God alone is al-Wakeel.  God makes this point 
clear even to Satan that he would have no authority over believers, for 
God alone is al-Wakeel.74  This specific exclusion of the prophets and 
Satan from the ultimate trusteeship is meant to illuminate God’s 
exclusive power over affairs of the universe.75  It is also meant to clarify 
that prophets, though dear to God, do not share God’s powers and, more 
fundamentally, that the line between God and a prophet should never be 
crossed. 
Even though the Quran repeatedly informs readers that God is the 
most reliable al-Wakeel, no relationship of singular trust between God 
and man76 comes into being unless man has a trusting heart.  Those who 
do not believe in God, says the Quran, have hearts that are filled with 
doubts and “waver between one thing and another.”77  If an individual 
believes that God is just, powerful, and sincere, and that He will not 
betray the individual’s genuine interests, a relationship of trust is formed.  
 
 69. According to the Quran, “the most beautiful names belong to [God].”  QURAN, 
sura al-A’raf 7:180. 
 70. Id. at  sura al-Imran 3:173 (God is sufficient, for He is the best wakeel). 
 71. Id. at sura al-An’am 6:66 (God instructs the Prophet to say to those who reject 
the truth that “I am not your [wakeel].”); see also id. at sura al-An’am 6:107; id. at sura 
al-Isra 17:54. 
 72. Id. at sura Yusuf 12:66–68. 
 73. Id. at sura al-Isra 17:2. 
 74. Id. at 17:65. 
 75. Id. at sura al-An’nam 6:102 (God is one and He has exclusive powers and the 
one ultimate wakeel). 
 76. Here, the word man is used to include both men and women.  The Quran uses 
the words insan or bashar that are gender neutral.  Liaquat Ali Khan, An Islamic View of 
the Battlefield, 7 BARRY L. REV. 21, 21 n.3 (2006). 
 77. QURAN, sura at-Tauba 9:45. 
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The individual will then be prepared to trust God in the disposal of 
his affairs. 
This doctrine of trusting God with human affairs has been the most 
reformist doctrine because it makes the individual fearless in facing 
adversity and challenging oppression.  Any injury that the trusting 
individual suffers—the loss of liberty or life—is God’s doing to which 
the individual submits with no resentment.  This striving trust in God, 
sometimes condemned as fundamentalism, and sometimes misunderstood 
by militants who resort to violence, is most threatening to unjust systems 
that rely on worldly sanctions to enforce tyranny. 
The doctrine of singular trust is no quiescent theology.  Its active 
consciousness is a practical tool to dismantle exploitative patronage.  
Throughout human history, patronage has been a favorite construct of 
oppression.  Rulers, landed aristocracy, nobles, and even church elites 
have used patronage to create relationships of dependence.  Patrons 
sponsored self-serving art and literature.  They also extended employment, 
loans, and protection, but rarely without a quid pro quo.  The beneficiaries 
must always give something precious in return.  They must show fidelity 
to the patrons’ person, family, ideology, values, and interests.  Exploitative 
patronage creates slavery-type social and economic bonds that the 
beneficiaries could not break without suffering loss of liberty and life. 
Patrons were indeed the false gods that Islam was determined to 
demolish.  Islam’s calling for the rejection of idols was not a theological 
self-righteousness.  It was to liberate man from man-made oppression 
and show him the way to attain existential freedom that opposes 
egotistic dictates of earthly patrons.  “Say, ‘Am I to take for my master 
anyone but God, the Originator of the heavens and the earth, when it is 
He who gives nourishment and Himself needs none?’”78  Earthly patrons 
feed in order to be fed; they help in order to be helped; they protect in 
order to be protected.  Earthly patronage is essentially self-serving.  
Contrast this patronage, the Quran implies, with that of God who feeds 
but has no need to be fed. 
Singular trust is, therefore, an inherently liberation doctrine that 
challenges man-made oppression.  This liberation doctrine is anti-
establishmentarian if the establishment uses instruments of fear to 
subdue the powerless.  Singular trust inspires the subjugated people to 
put their trust in God and refuse to submit to practices that degrade their 
 
 78. Id. at sura al-An’am 6:14. 
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spiritual, intellectual, and physical dignity.  The Quran furnishes the 
metaphor of the battlefield to illustrate God as the ultimate al-Wakeel.  
When the Prophet and his companions—a small force of limited 
means—were fighting for survival in the Battle of Uhd,79 they were 
frightened with a report that a powerful army was gathering against 
them.  The report designed to dishearten the Prophet and his companions, 
however, increased their faith in God and they said: “God alone is 
sufficient for us, and He is the best al-Wakeel.”80  Dismantling man-
made injustices, brick by brick, in a patient and persistent manner, is the 
central message of singular trust. 
Take, for example, slavery in the seventh century when the Quran was 
revealed.  Islam did not outlaw slavery, but it strongly advocated for the 
humanization and manumission of slaves.  This advocacy was necessary 
for banishing slavery from the hearts of slave masters.81  The Quran 
warns Muslims that righteousness should not be reduced to ritual turning 
of faces for worship to the East or to the West, but that real righteousness 
consists of right beliefs and good deeds, including the ransom paid for 
the manumission of slaves.82  This command reversed the link between 
wealth and slavery.  Wealth was to be used to buy the freedom of slaves 
rather than to buy their servitude.  The Prophet’s Sunna further established 
spiritual and practical rules to weaken the institution of slavery 
consistent with the doctrine of singular trust: According to the Prophet, 
freeing slaves assured masters’ freedom from Hellfire.83  Whoever frees 
his portion of a common slave, said the Prophet, should free the slave 
completely if he has the means to pay the rest of the slave’s total price.84  
The best kind of manumission is the manumission of “the most 
expensive slave and the most beloved by his master.”85  The Prophet 
ordered the manumission of slaves at the time of solar and lunar 
eclipses.86  The Prophet assured a double reward for a master who 
educates a female slave, treats her nicely, and then manumits her.87  
With respect to slaves not freed, the Prophet ordered Muslims to treat 
them as brothers, feeding them what they themselves ate, clothing them 
 
 79. Id. at sura al-Imran 3:172 n.130. 
 80. Id. at 3:173. 
 81. Cf. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 129, 309–10 (2003) (stating that Southern planters believed that they were 
designed to be masters). 
 82. QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:177. 
 83. 3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, § 46:693, at 419. 
 84. Id. § 46:704, at 423. 
 85. Id. § 46:694, at 420. 
 86. Id. § 46:695–96, at 420. 
 87. Id. § 46:720, at 433. 
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with what they themselves wore, and sharing their work, if the work is 
more burdensome than the slaves could handle.88 
B.  Singular Duty 
While justice-based advocacy in Islam arose from God’s revelations to 
a Prophet born among the early seventh century Arab pagans, the 
common law concept of zealous advocacy—the concept and not the 
phrase—surfaced in a royal scandal in early nineteenth century Great 
Britain.  Henry Brougham,89 the British scientist, writer, founder of the 
Edinburgh Review, and lawyer, articulated the notion of singular duty in 
defending Queen Caroline of Brunswick, a princess born in Germany 
and married to the unpopular British King, George IV.  On ascending the 
throne in 1820, George IV wished to divorce his estranged wife accused 
of committing adultery—a high treason under the laws.  The Pain and 
Penalties Bill 1820 was introduced in the House of Lords “to deprive 
Her Majesty, Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, of the Title, Prerogatives, 
Rights, Privileges, and Exemptions of Queen Consort of this Realm; and 
to dissolve the Marriage between His Majesty and said Caroline Amelia 
Elizabeth.”90  This Divorce Bill—the British version of the American 
Bill of Attainder, under which the legislature acts as the judicial 
magistrate91—was a public trial of the Queen who, despite her lifestyle 
transgressions,92 commanded the sympathies of the British people.93 
Henry Brougham, the Queen’s legal advisor, defended the Queen 
before the House of Lords.  It was no trial, said Brougham, but “every 
channel of defamation had been opened and poured upon the accused.”94  
In defending the Queen, Brougham knew that he was fighting against, as 
 
 88. SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 54, Kitab al-Aiman 15:4092, at 1067–68. 
 89. See generally Michael Lobban, Henry Brougham and Law Reform, 115 ENG. 
HIST. REV. 1184, 1184–1215 (2000) (discussing Brougham’s career and reform efforts). 
 90. 3 PARL. DEB., H.L. (1st ser.) (1820) 1727. 
 91. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1866). 
 92. In 1806, a commission investigated the charges against Caroline that she had 
birthed an illegitimate child.  The commission found her innocent but imprudent. 
 93. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, Conscientious Belief of the Innocence of the Queen 
Declared, in OPINIONS OF LORD BROUGHAM, at ix–x, 124 (Paris, Baudry’s European 
Library 1841) [hereinafter OPINIONS]. 
 94. 3 LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 
8 (Harper & Brothers 1872) [hereinafter LIFE AND TIMES], available at http://books. 
google.com/ (search “Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham”; then follow first 
hyperlink entitled “The Life and Times of Henry, Lord Brougham”). 
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he put it, “the strong hand of an unscrupulous power.”95  Here, he uttered 
the famous words to conceptualize the lawyer’s singular duty to defend 
and protect his client: 
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty of his connexion with his client, knows, in the 
discharge of that office, but one person in the world—that client and none other.  
To save that client by all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards 
and costs to all others, and among others to himself, is the highest and most 
unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the 
torment, the destruction which he may bring upon others; nay, separating even 
the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the 
consequences, if his fate should unhappily be to involve his country in 
confusion for his client.96 
“No stronger statement in Anglo-American law of the single-minded 
duty owed by attorney to client can be found than that of Henry 
Brougham.”97  This duty to defend the client, even if the lawyer has to 
renounce patriotism, has little to do with courtroom demeanor or aggressive 
behavior.  Brougham was not advocating incivility or disrespect.  He 
uttered his statement in the British House of Lords, where manners were 
valued even to prudish limits.  What Brougham emphasized was the 
lawyer’s duty to use the full force of laws, substantive and procedural, 
without fear of the state or favor to the country, in the service of a cause. 
Brougham’s view of singular duty is most certainly anti-establishmentarian, 
prepared to challenge the entrenched forces of an unjust imperial order.  
However, it is by no means anarchist or cynical.  In his own words, 
Brougham is not “a passive and idle spectator of the ravages of time” 
and he also notes that “a rash, hasty, wholesale system of change is 
utterly abhorrent to my views.”98  He discarded patriotism not because 
the love of country is inherently ill, but because it can compromise 
honest and forceful defense of a just cause.  Brougham’s words may also 
be misinterpreted to declare that he was promoting atomistic advocacy 
that throws away larger concerns to pursue a narrow mission.  In its 
proper historical context, however, Brougham uttered these words to 
expose the hypocrisy of the British royal establishment that was 
determined to inflict pain and punishment on a Queen rendezvousing 
with an Italian of “low origin”99 but was most forgiving to the King who 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, The Duty of an Advocate to His Client, in OPINIONS, 
supra note 93, at 107. 
 97. Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1022 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (Wallach, 
J., concurring). 
 98. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, Repudiation of Violence in Reform, in OPINIONS, 
supra note 93, at 68. 
 99. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, The History of Bergami, the Alleged Paramour of 
the Queen, in OPINIONS, supra note 93, at 118–19. 
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himself had extramarital relations with a Catholic mistress, contrary to 
the laws of the nation.100  In the conclusion of his speech in defense of 
the Queen, Brougham quoted from Scriptures to warn the Lords that 
they should not “[harden] their hearts” to serve “the purposes of unjust 
judgments.”101 
Even if there had surfaced no royal scandal or existed no Queen 
Caroline, Brougham was the ideal man to proclaim the concept of 
singular duty to the client in tearing apart unjust practices.  Brougham 
traced his own zeal for justice from the schools in Scotland where the 
educational system cultivated “higher objects than mere learning” and 
inculcated “a nobler ambition than the mere acquisition of prosody and 
the dead languages.”102  Brougham could have justified reformist advocacy 
in defending the right to education of children whose parents lacked the 
means to send them to schools in the Dickensian England.103  He could 
have uttered these words in Manchester in the defense of thirty-eight 
handloom weavers who, while forming a trade union, were charged with 
sedition to destroy steam looms.  In each case, Brougham’s reformist 
advocacy on behalf of the powerless was cause-inspired and had a vivid 
moral purpose.  Brougham was a law reformer.104 
Long before the Queen’s trial, Brougham had been a strong advocate 
for the abolition of the African slave trade.  He highlighted the immorality 
of the “base practice” of using the whip to compel men and women 
slaves to toil at plantations.105  The British Parliament had passed laws to 
abolish the slave trade but no real efforts were made to effectuate the 
laws.  Brougham knew that no legislative measure could “at once destroy 
slave-trade”106 for it “had entwined itself with so many interests, prejudices, 
 
 100. The British public had no lasting love for the Queen but in a duel with the 
King, she was certainly the lesser evil. 
 101. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, Conclusion of the Speech in Defence of the Queen, 
in OPINIONS, supra note 93, at 119–20. 
 102. LIFE AND TIMES, supra note 94, at 9. 
 103. The five education bills that Brougham introduced in the Parliament in 1820, 
1835, 1837, 1838, and 1839 were all defeated.  See G.F.A. Baer, Henry Lord Brougham: 
Champion of Popular Education, 6 HIST. EDUC. J. 153, 158–59 (1954). 
 104. Lobban, supra note 89, at 1182–1215. 
 105. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, The Comparison Instituted Between the West India 
Slaves and the Roman Domestic Slaves, in OPINIONS, supra note 93, at 149. 
 106. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, Course of the Anti-Slavery Principle, in OPINIONS, 
supra note 93, at 27–28. 
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and passions.”107  This realism, however, did not extinguish his zeal and 
tenacity.  He continued to expose the hypocrisy of the Empire, arguing 
that “we never failed at all when our object was to obtain new colonies 
and extend the slave-trade.”108  But failure had struck the Empire now 
that “[its] object [was] to abolish or limit this same slave-trade.”109  
Artfully chiding his supportive colleagues in the Parliament, Brougham 
drew a distinction between sincerity and fervor for a good cause—“that 
we have been very sincere, no doubt, but, rather cold; without a particle 
of ill-will towards the abolition, but without one spark of zeal in its 
favour.”110  Zeal, rather than mere sincerity, as the key to dismantling 
social injustices had been Brougham’s persistent message. 
C.  Judicial Independence 
Reformist advocacy is meaningful only if judges are independent, fair, 
competent, and of high moral character.  Furthermore, judges must have 
no personal stake in litigation outcomes, as do lawmakers who may lose 
their seats in the legislature if they act contrary to wishes of the people 
or campaign contributors.  Most secular systems vouch for an independent 
judiciary and assure judges that no harm would visit them for exercising 
prudent judicial options.  Despite theoretical constructs of judicial 
independence, judges may be unable to overcome their personal prejudices, 
political preferences, social bonds, and other mental facts that affect 
decisions.111 
The Quran commands judges to decide cases between parties “with 
justice.”112  In Islam, as in Judaism, however, justice is softened with 
forgiveness.113  Advocacy as a calling to dismantle injustices lies at the 
core of Islamic faith.  “I will not become a witness for injustice”114 is its 
 
 107. LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, National Honour—The Slave-Trade, in OPINIONS, 
supra note 93, at 28. 
 108. Id.. 
 109. Id. at 29. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ali Khan, Suppressive Rulings, NAT’L L.J., July 24, 2006, at P31 (analyzing 
why Turkish judges have been attacked for their secular stance against the Islamic scarf).  
Even the European Court of Human Rights has been criticized for its prejudice against 
the Islamic scarf.  See Carolyn Evans, The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 7 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 52, 71 (2006). 
 112. QURAN, sura al-Nisa 4:58. 
 113. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 
1135, 1158 n.105 (2000) (citing Ann Kathleen Bradley, Seeking Forgiveness in the 
World’s Spiritual Traditions, SPIRITUALITY & HEALTH, Winter 1999, at 29). 
 114. “Narrated An-Nu'man bin Bashir: My mother asked my father to present me a 
gift from his property; and he gave it to me after some hesitation.  My mother said that 
she would not be satisfied unless the Prophet was made a witness to it.  I being a young 
boy, my father held me by the hand and took me to the Prophet.  He said to the Prophet, 
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defining attribute.  Islamic ethos resists atomistic versions of advocacy 
that defend the client’s interests to the exclusion of those of other parties 
to the dispute, and sometimes even to the exclusion of community 
interests. 
IV.  SHARED ETHICS 
In their respective doctrines of singular trust and singular duty, Islamic 
and common law traditions espouse shared ethics that constitute the 
heart of reformist advocacy.  First, both traditions strongly believe that 
forceful arguments can be made with good manners and that rough 
manners hurt the cause of advocacy.  As indicated in Part II, advocacy 
demeanor and substantive zeal do not make a congenital twin.  A lawyer 
weak in substantive zeal may adopt an aggressive demeanor.  And a 
lawyer with a highly reformist ideology may be gentle and even vulnerable 
in manners.  Both Islamic and common law traditions disapprove aggressive 
demeanor and commend advocates who are strong in persuasion but 
respectful in manners.  The strength of advocacy rests in its power of 
reasoning, and not in its aggressive demeanor. 
Second, both traditions embrace a universal understanding that the 
advocate’s personal character cannot be separated from his power of 
persuasion.  A lawyer with questionable moral character cannot be the 
voice of justice just as a liar cannot preach truth effectively.  Good manners 
carry little impact if the advocate’s personal character is untrustworthy.  
Effective advocacy is rarely severable from the person of the lawyer.  
Communication skills, choice of words, quality of voice, eye contact, 
gestures, postures, are some of the attributes of personal advocacy.  In 
lawsuits, therefore, where the competing stories are equally credible, 
where issues are complex, or where the law itself is controversial, the 
advocate’s personal goodness, particularly his trustworthiness and 
sincerity on the position he takes, may turn out to be a decisive factor 
that tilts the case in his favor.  If a lawyer is unable to acquire the trust of 
the court or the jury, his advocacy skills do not help and might even 
backfire on him to his client’s detriment. 
 
‘His mother, bint Rawaha, requested me to give this boy a gift.’  The Prophet said, ‘Do 
you have other sons besides him?’  He said, ‘Yes.’  The Prophet said, ‘Do not make me a 
witness for injustice.’  Narrated Ash-Shabi that the Prophet said, ‘I will not become a 
witness for injustice.’”  3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, § 48:818, at 497. 
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A.  Courageous and Courteous Manners 
Courageous and courteous manners—aadab—are an integral part of 
the Islamic faith.  They are integral parts of internal ethics.  The Basic 
Code commands persons of faith to practice good manners in all acts and 
at all occasions, even when practicing good manners is hard.115  Good 
manners are not mere personal preferences or social etiquettes; they are 
related to existential and legal matters. 
In divorce litigation, in which parties are often inclined to be contentious 
and vicious, the Quran mandates that good manners be observed to make 
divorce easy on the parties.  After the waiting period is over, divorcing 
husbands who might be inclined to cruelty and vengefulness are specifically 
instructed to either reconcile in a fair manner or separate in a fair 
manner.116  They must not play games, such as proposing bad faith 
reconciliations with the intention of torturing their estranged wives.117  
Of course, parties of faith do not authorize their lawyers to do what they 
themselves are prohibited from doing.  The lawyers of faith, as 
representatives of their clients, do everything to make divorce the least 
painful for both parties. 
Al-Ghazali devotes a significant portion of his scholarship in 
explaining good manners in Islam.118  In Islam, everything including 
dispute resolution leads to God-consciousness, because with God rests 
the final outcome of all events.119  Good manners are practiced not for 
gaining social approval or to show off a cultivated self.  Good manners 
are practiced primarily to offer gratitude to God.  Take the simplest and 
the most common act that all human beings perform every day: eating.  
Al-Ghazali explains that eating is an act of worship.120  Eating is 
indispensable for the maintenance of the human body because a healthy 
body helps individuals in discharging their worldly and spiritual 
obligations.  Eating as an act of worship, therefore, requires the food to 
 
 115. Occasions to practice good manners would include the pilgrimage during 
which believers, experiencing an intense state of spirituality, abstain from lewd speech 
and quarreling.  QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:197.  In taking care of old and frail parents, 
the persons of faith do not even utter the word ugh to their parents, let alone scold them; 
and they always speak to parents in the most reverent and kind speech.  Id. at sura al-
Isra 17:23; Liaquat Ali Khan, Taking Care of Old and Frail Parents, PAKISTAN LINK, Ju
ne 11, 2004, http://www.pakistanlink.com/opinion/2004/june04/11/01.html. 
 116. See QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:231. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Good manners in almost all aspects of life are discussed.  See generally 2 AL-
GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 117–38, 207–24 (proscribing rules of good conduct and 
recounting the Prophets good conduct), available at http://www.ghazali.org/books/ihya-
v2.pdf. 
 119. QURAN, sura Luqman 31:22. 
 120. 2 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 1–2. 
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be halal,121 that is, clean and obtained through lawful means.122  Just as 
an act of worship is performed after ablution, good manners require 
washing dirty hands before eating.123  And just as prayers are performed 
with humility, food is consumed in a state of thankfulness.124 
The halal food is no mere dietary prescription.  In lawyering, it is 
directly related to professional ethics.  For example, the Quran prohibits 
trustees, which include lawyers, from consuming property that lawfully 
belongs to others, substituting good items with worthless items, or 
mixing the beneficiary’s accounts with those of the trustee for the 
purpose of embezzlement.125  These ethics allow trustees of faith to 
consume halal food.  Food items purchased with unlawful funds are 
unclean, and consuming unclean foods is a breach of God’s “clear” 
decree of sustenance.126  This way, good manners against embezzlement 
are not confined to premises of the court or to law chambers.  These 
manners assert themselves in foods purchased with embezzled money 
and arrive home with the unlawful foods the lawyer brings for his 
family, and the foods, nay the fire,127 he pours in bellies of the family.  
For lawyers of faith, embezzlement is not merely a violation of internal 
and external ethics; it is defiance of God. 
Just like eating, speaking too is an act of worship.  The Basic Code 
instructs persons of faith to cultivate good speech manners—manners 
that constitute the core of written and oral advocacy.  Speaking truthfully 
is the Quran’s most emphatic lesson: God speaks the truth.128  And God 
knows what we reveal in our speech and what we conceal.129  And 
“[t]hey say with their tongues what is not in their hearts.”130  The 
 
 121. QURAN, sura al-Ma’idah 5:88. 
 122. Id. at sura al-Baqara 2:172 (commanding followers to eat good things and 
thank God). 
 123. 2 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 2. 
 124. QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:172 (commanding followers to eat good things and 
thank God).  Eating in a hurry or with mouthful bites or arrogantly or greedily is contrary 
to good manners.  Eating with bad manners is also detrimental to bodily health. 
 125. Id. at sura an-Nisa 4:2.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) 
(1983) (mandating separate account for the client’s funds). 
 126. QURAN, sura Hud 11:6 (noting that God provides sustenance to all creatures); 
id. at sura an-Nahl 16:71 (specifying that unequal distribution of sustenance is part of 
God’s plan). 
 127. Id. at sura n-Nisa 4:10 (warning that eating the property of orphans is like 
eating fire). 
 128. Id. at sura al-Imran 3:95; id. at sura al-Ahzab 33:4. 
 129. Id. at sura al-Anbiya 21:110. 
 130. Id. at sura al-Fath 48:11. 
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Prophet said that lying carries bad odor that repulses angels.131  Just as 
unclean foods contaminate the body, lies sully the soul.  Lies also befoul 
the air and the atmosphere.  These internal ethics assist lawyers of faith 
in purifying written and oral advocacy.  The lawyers of faith do not 
conceal evidence,132 nor do they lie to their clients, opponents, or courts.  
A court is a place of truth that must not be polluted with lies in civil or 
criminal cases.  Parties, witnesses, and lawyers, particularly when they 
all are persons of faith, must tell the truth, the whole truth, so that 
disputes are resolved honestly and efficiently consistent with the 
Quran’s instruction that persons of faith “speak words straight to the 
point.”133 
Furthermore, it is not enough to speak the truth.  Even the truth must 
be spoken with good manners.  Speaking truth is no license to raise 
voice or use odious language.  The Quran strongly disapproves speaking 
in a harsh voice, comparing harsh voices with the braying of asses.134  
The Prophet strongly disapproved of persons who quarrel in an insulting 
manner.135  In light of these guidelines, lawyers must speak the truth and 
dispute with each other with courtesy and decorum, avoiding unilateral 
or mutual insults.  Truthful and honorable speech is the ethical standard 
that the Basic Code offers to lawyers for arguing cases and resolving 
disputes through settlement. 
Just as the Islamic tradition requires good manners in disputation, the 
common law tradition prescribes similar values.  In the United States, 
advocacy136 runs into difficulty when lawyers cross the invisible line 
between permissible zeal and ethical violations.137  American courts 
tolerate what they call aggressive advocacy.138  No litigation defense or 
strategy in their view, however, warrants that lawyers sacrifice “respect 
 
 131. 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF HADITH 24 (Maulana Muhammad Razi Khan Afridi ed., 
Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd. 2007) (citing Imam Tirmidhi). 
 132. Al-Ghazali discusses few exceptional cases when not telling the whole truth 
might be allowed.  For example, concealing truth will be allowed to save the life of an 
innocent person.  3 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 216. 
 133. QURAN, sura al-Ahzab 34:70. 
 134. Id. at sura Luqman 31:19. 
 135. 3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, The Book of Oppressions 43:639, at 382. 
 136. Several courts mention aggressive advocacy in a positive light, distinguishing 
it from misconduct.  See, e.g., Zamboroski v. Karr, No. 04-73194, 2006 WL 3253271, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2006) (appreciating aggressive advocacy); Boston Scientific 
Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 308, 317–18 (D. Del. 2006) (discussing 
aggressive advocacy and attorney misconduct). 
 137. In United States courts, the phrase zealous advocacy appears for the first time 
in 1966 in an opinion of the Military Court of Appeals.  United States v. Tackett, 36 
C.M.R. 382, 386 (C.M.A. 1966) (taking a negative view of the overzealous advocacy of 
the trial counsel). 
 138. Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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and dignity for the adjudication process.”139  Civility is conducive to 
contemplative justice, say the courts, but not meant to turn courtroom 
lawyers into “obsequious sycophants in order to avoid offending the 
fragile sensibilities of judges.”140  In disciplining aggressive lawyers, 
American courts repeatedly remind legal professionals that they must 
conduct themselves with courtesy in dealing with opposing counsel, 
cross-examining witnesses, and interacting with judges.  Denouncing the 
war-like imagery of aggressive advocacy, the courts issue frequent 
reminders like this one: “Lawyers are not free, like loose cannons, to fire 
at will upon any target of opportunity which appears on the legal landscape.  
The practice of law is not and cannot be a free fire zone.”141  These 
criticisms are primarily aimed at the lawyer’s advocacy demeanor. 
Sharswood draws the ethical portrait of an advocate who is simultaneously 
courageous and courteous.  A courageous advocate represents a client 
without fear of the client’s adversary who might be “a man of station, 
wealth, and influence.”142  Vigorous advocacy against powerful adversaries, 
however, carries the risk of retaliation.  Parties, including governments, 
often refuse to distinguish between their opponents and lawyers who 
represent them.  If a lawyer is vigorously advocating his client’s cause, 
the lawyer is not only identified with the client but may be seen as an 
aider and abettor.143  In emotional cases, hatred for opponents is often 
transferred to their attorneys.144  Lawyers all over the world have been 
arrested, assaulted, and even killed for challenging power centers and 
defending unpopular clients.145  Sharswood’s courageous advocate may 
adopt security measures but he does “not permit such thoughts to arise in 
his mind” and fearlessly performs his duty to the client and the cause.146  
In 1898, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared: “An independent 
 
 139. Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 833 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (Ohio 2005). 
 140. Disciplinary Counsel v. Breiner, 969 P.2d 1285, 1291 (Haw. 1999). 
 141. Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 147, 162 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 142. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 118. 
 143. Cf. Michael M. Schmidt, Neither Aider Nor Abettor Be: Attorneys Become 
Prosecutorial Targets for Federal Healthcare Crimes, 32 J. HEALTH L. 251, 264 (1999) 
(arguing that the aiding and abetting liability should not be imposed on lawyers without 
showing both actual knowledge of wrongdoing and wrongful intent). 
 144. Marian Neudel, Letter to the Editor, Good Office Security Should Be Real 
Concern for All Lawyers, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 3, 2007, at 2. 
 145. John F. Burns & Christine Hauser, 3rd Saddam Lawyer is Killed in Baghdad, 
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 22, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/ 
06/21/news/iraq.php. 
 146. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 118. 
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and fearless bar is a necessary part of the heritage of a people free by the 
standards of Anglo Saxon freedom.”147 
A courageous advocate must also be courteous.  No lawyer, says 
Sharswood, should “allow himself to be hired to abuse the opposite 
party.”148  Good manners require that an opponent and his witnesses “be 
treated with civility and courtesy.”149  In promoting good manners, 
Sharswood makes both class-based and pragmatic arguments.  Invoking 
“the bearing, of a gentleman,” Sharswood urges lawyers to adopt high 
class manners that shun unbecoming language even when severe things 
must be said.150  Making a pragmatic argument derived from self interest, 
Sharswood cautions lawyers to treat the opponent’s witnesses with 
respect because their mistreatment “tells badly on the jury.”151  Adopting 
Sharswood’s proposed ethics, the first Code of Professional Ethics in the 
United States declared in Sharswood’s precise words that “it is not a 
desirable professional reputation to live and die with-that of a rough 
tongue.”152  In providing a more nuanced balance between courage and 
courtesy, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that “[t]he 
lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of 
offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the 
legal process with courtesy and respect.”153 
B.  Good Character 
The personal character under Islamic law is known as khuluq, a word 
in the Quran.154  When the Prophet was advocating submission to One 
God, he was derided and accused of suffering from madness.  God 
advised the Prophet to continue to display the best character as he had in 
the past,155 and to continue consistent good behavior, says the Quran, 
one must distinguish reasonableness from madness.156  It is most instructive 
that the Quran ties truth of the message to truth of the messenger’s 
personal character.  No matter how persuasive the message is, it will 
 
 147. Commonwealth v. Hill, 39 A. 1055, 1055 (Pa. 1898).  The Court, however, cautioned 
lawyers not to evade the due course of legal justice.  Id. 
 148. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 118. 
 149. Id. at 119. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS, Canon 26 (1899), reprinted in 
HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS app. F at 358 (1953); see SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, 
at 118. 
 153. MODEL RULES PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007). 
 154. QURAN, sura al Qalam 68:4; Ebrahim Moosa, Muslim Ethics?, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237, 237–38 (William Schweiker ed., 2005). 
 155. QURAN, sura al Qalam 68:4. 
 156. Id. at 68:6. 
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have little impact if the audience has doubts about the advocate’s 
character.  “On the Day of Resurrection,” said the Prophet, “[t]here is 
nothing heavier than good character put in the scale of a believer.”157 
In delivering professional ethics, Sharswood is most emphatic in 
weaving direct ties between the lawyer’s character and his profession, 
saying “that no man can ever be a truly great lawyer, who is not in every 
sense of the word, a good man.”158  He concedes that a lawyer without 
personal integrity may shine for a while, but such a lawyer can have 
no permanent success as “his light will soon go out in blackness of 
darkness.”159  In drawing the importance of character in law practice, 
Sharswood seems to be addressing new lawyers who are under tremendous 
pressure to make a living, particularly if they lack other means to support 
themselves.160  In hardship and struggle for professional survival, a lawyer 
may consider goodness as a barrier to success.  In these trying times, 
Sharswood advises new lawyers that “the strictest principles of integrity 
and honor” offer the best safety.161  Losing goodness is no apocalyptic 
event; it is no one big error; it is no one huge bad decision.  Furnishing 
remarkable insights, Sharswood explains that good character “whispers 
away” when a lawyer swerves “from truth and fairness, in small 
particulars.”162  One’s character is secreted in details of his behavior. 
In the United States, jury trials in both criminal and civil cases are 
demonstrations of the lawyer’s character.  Expert trial lawyers and 
experienced judges agree “that a jury tries the lawyers and not the 
case.”163  An advocate must know that the jurors see him more than his 
client.  In criminal cases, the client may never say a word in the 
courtroom.  Even in civil cases, the client’s exposure to the jury is 
 
 157. 3 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, Kitab al-Adab bk. 36, No. 4781 (Ahmad Hasan trans., 
1984).  Consistent with these injunctions, Muslim countries have adopted codes of 
professional responsibility that require good manners and good character.  Pakistani 
rules, for example, disqualify lawyers from practicing law if they have been convicted of 
an offense involving moral turpitude or if they have been dismissed from service of 
government or of a public statutory corporation on charges of misconduct or moral 
turpitude.  Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act, No. XXXV of 1973, § 28A (Pak.), 
amended by Act of Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.pbbarcouncil.com/downloads/ 
barcouncil_act_amended_2005.pdf. 
 158. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 168. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948). 
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limited.  But in both criminal and civil cases, “the lawyer is before the 
jury all the time.”164  The jurors pay attention not only to what the 
lawyer says and does, but also who he is as a person. 
Argumentum ad hominem refers to personal attacks in argumentation.  
Personal attacks violate the rules of decency and courtesy.  Advocacy 
conducted by means of personal attacks is ineffective and no good 
lawyer substitutes insults for good arguments.  Logic rejects argumentum ad 
hominem as a valid response.  Logic requires that what is said, and not 
who is saying it, belongs to the realm of authentic discourse.  The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy takes issue with “Aristotle’s 
suggestion that the ethos of a speaker plays a critical role in determining 
whether an argument is persuasive or not.”165  Turning Aristotle on his 
head, the Encyclopedia asserts that an ad hominem argument “undermines, 
not the ethos of the person attacked, but the ethos of the speaker who has 
presented it.”166 
Distaste for argumentum ad hominem, however, does not refute the 
thesis that the ethos of the arguer matters.  A known deliberate liar, for 
example, will be ineffective in persuading an audience that he “[n]ever 
tell lies,”167 unless his presentation is self-referential in that he discloses 
how his own lies have destroyed his reputation and fortune.  The 
audience does pay attention to the speaker’s character and evaluates his 
utterances in light of his manifest behavior.  If the speaker is unknown, 
the audience may interpret his gestures and speech not only to 
understand what he is saying but also to speculate what kind of person 
he is. 
The personal life of an advocate is inseparable from his role as an 
advocate.  Privacy is no hideout for lawyers.  The lawyer’s personal life 
constitutes the invisible part of his advocacy.  And the lawyer’s 
character reputation is inseparable from his law practice.  For example, 
a lawyer who commits a criminal act is most likely to lose his 
trustworthiness.168  Similarly, a lawyer engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is rarely an effective 
advocate.169  Codes of professional responsibility sanction lawyers engaged 
in criminal or fraudulent activity. 
 
 164. Id. at 62 (quoting HARRY SABBATH BODIN, SELECTING A JURY 50 (1945)). 
 165. Leo Groarke, Informal Logic, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 9.  
Example: Ad Hominem (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/logic-informal/#One. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argumentum ad Hominem, 49 J. 
PHIL. 489, 495 (1952). 
 168. MODEL RULES PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2007). 
 169. See id. R. 8.4(c). 
KHAN.DOC 9/4/2008  11:40:06 AM 
[VOL. 45:  547, 2008]  Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 575 
C.  Internal and External Ethics 
Good manners and good character are core advocacy ethics under 
Islam and common law.  The enforcement of these ethics, however, 
differs under the two traditions.  The Islamic tradition uses both fear of 
God and fear of sanctions to demand compliance.  The secular tradition 
of common law, however, relies solely on sanctions to enforce professional 
ethics.  Nonetheless, the secularization of common law ethics does 
not prevent lawyers of faith, some of whom are Muslims, from God-
consciousness in their professional lives. 
To understand God-consciousness, internal ethics may be distinguished 
from external ethics.  Internal ethics reside in faith.  They are an integral 
part of one’s spirituality.  By contrast, external ethics are man-made rules.  
For example, the ABA Code of Professional Conduct is an example of 
external ethics.  Internal ethics are existential; they are enforced by the 
person himself.  External ethics are coercive; they are enforced by means 
of disciplinary sanctions.170 
The Quran supports the distinction between internal and external 
ethics.  The concept of taqwa furnishes internal ethics whereas the concept 
of takhsa refers to external ethics.171  The opening chapters of the Quran 
forewarn that the Quran is a book of guidance for those who practice 
taqwa.172  Taqwa is God-consciousness.  In its simplest meaning, taqwa 
means the fear of God.  God says in the Quran, “Do not fear them, but 
fear Me.”173  This command was first given to the Prophet and through 
him to all believers.  “Them” refers to false gods and patrons of injustice.  
Taqwa is not the fearlessness of a self-righteous brute.  Nor is it a state 
of mind that arises from misinformed militancy.  In matters of law, 
taqwa furnishes a firm understanding that God is just and supports 
lawyers of faith who use their intellectual and spiritual resources to seek 
justice, without imposing their faith on others.174 
 
 170. JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 186 (Barbara 
Herman ed., 2000).  John Rawls provides a powerful distinction between external and 
internal legislation.  The external legislation uses the fear of sanctions to determine 
behavior whereas internal legislation is an attribute of virtue that also determines 
behavior.  Id. 
 171. Takhsha or Khashya mean the fear of man. 
 172. QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:2. 
 173. Id. at 2:150; id. at sura al-Ma’idah 5:3, 5:44; id. at sura al-Tauba 9:13; id. at 
sura al-Ahzab 33:37. 
 174. Id. at sura al-Baqara 2:256 (asserting that there is no coercion in faith). 
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In the realm of advocacy, the lawyer of faith draws personal strength 
from practicing internal ethics.  As a general rule of guidance, the lawyer 
of faith understands that God is pleased when he engages in ethically 
responsible advocacy and displeased when he engages in ethical violations.  
Internal ethics are thus the knowledge of God’s permissions and 
prohibitions.  The lawyer of faith develops the cognitive sense of right 
and wrong in the spiritual context of internal ethics.  The lawyer of faith 
transacts the business of the day fully conscious of internal ethics.  His 
claims and counterclaims on behalf of others are not separated from his 
internal ethics.  For the lawyers of faith, therefore, internal ethics are not 
merely a theological construct having no relevance to the practice of law.  
Internal ethics are an active part of the lawyer’s intellectual cognition and 
spiritual intelligence.  They constitute the lawyer’s character that inspires 
him to engage in ethically informed advocacy. 
The Quran contrasts taqwa, the fear of God, with takhsha, the fear of 
man.175  Consider a lawyer who does not believe in God.  Fear of God is 
no part of his internal ethics.  Even this lawyer, however, may develop a 
sense of internal ethics derived from humanistic reflection or experience.  
Now consider a lawyer without internal ethics.  Suppose this lawyer wishes 
to embezzle the client’s funds.  Even though no internal ethics guide this 
lawyer, the fear of sanctions may deter the lawyer from the prohibited 
conduct.  Thus, even in the absence of internal ethics, the fear of penalties— 
takhsha—may prevent ethical violations.176  In secular advocacy, takhsha 
of disciplinary sanctions plays a significant role in the enforcement of 
professional ethics. 
Internal and external ethics are not always mutually exclusive, nor are 
they always in harmony.  The behavior prohibited under external ethics may 
also be forbidden under internal ethics.  In such cases, internal and external 
ethics create a combined psychological intelligence against the proscribed 
behavior.  But when the two ethics collide with each other, the lawyers of 
faith choose internal ethics.  They do not compromise God-consciousness 
for what the Quran calls “a miserable price.”177  This internalized ethics 
orientation, however, does not have to take the route of militancy. 
 
 175. Id. at sura al-Ma’idah 5:44. 
 176. Even in civil cases, khashya of losing property may dictate parties not to 
breach contracts or civil laws.  Khashya may force corporations not to manufacture 
dangerous products if law imposes stiff penalties. 
 177. QURAN, sura al-Ma’idah 5:44.  Khashya, however, occupies the character of a 
coward who loses all personal courage to say or do the right thing.  Few persons of faith 
abandon taqwa for the sake of khashya.  In a verse of the Quran, God exposes the duality 
of fears to teach the Prophet: “That you feared the people, whereas it is more befitting 
for you to fear God.”  Id. at sura al-Ahzab 33:37.  The Prophet is reported to have said 
that a coward shrinks from defending even his father and mother.  MUWATTA’ IMAM 
MALIK, Kitab al-Jihad 7:982, at 208 (Muhammad Rahimuddin trans., 1980). 
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V.  ADVOCACY DEVELOPMENTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 
This section and the next explain that in both Islamic and common law 
traditions, reformative advocacy gradually began to lose its original 
mission of dismantling injustices. 
In Islam, the doctrine of singular trust was compromised once Muslims 
instituted their own empires.  The notion that the Caliph is God’s vice 
regent established a culture of obedience rather than reformist militancy 
for the establishment of justice.  Although the Caliph’s infallibility could 
never become a central thesis of Islamic theocracy or political theory, 
and although some Caliphs were cruel and some openly un-Islamic, the 
tradition of challenging the authority lost its way.  Furthermore, Islamic 
law developed primarily in schools of great jurists and rarely in courts of 
the Caliphs.  The notion of justice and a profound distaste for oppression 
erected a wall of separation between Caliphs and jurists.  Independent-
minded jurists refused to become part of the Muslim Empires and they 
continued to issue private opinions—fatwas—to guide the development 
of law.  Even this enterprise was severely compromised during the era of 
strict precedents—taqlid—when a jurisprudential quietude was imposed 
declaring that Islamic law had been perfected and that no future 
generation could rethink or reinterpret the basic sources of Islamic law, 
that is, the Quran and the Sunna. 
A.  Technical Developments 
In Islamic legal history, two significant technical developments took 
place with respect to the concept of wakeel.  First, the term wakeel has 
been gradually humanized and legalized.  Second, advocacy has been 
added to the concept of representation.  The second development is more 
significant because it deviates from the strictures of ancient Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
Shirk, that is, associating partners with God, is strictly prohibited in 
Islam.  It is, however, acceptable to give God’s names to human beings.178  
Thus, even though the Quran repeatedly states that God alone is al-Wakeel, 
human beings could use this name without violating any fundamental 
 
 178. In many Muslim communities, Wakeel is an acceptable male name, although 
the full name might be Abdu-al-Wakeel, which means, the slave of al-Wakeel, thus 
preserving the distinction between man and God.  The lack of intention on part of the 
family or community to commit shirk is critical in naming children with God’s names 
mentioned in the Quran. 
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tenets of Islam.  The humanization of God’s name, al-Wakeel, introduced 
the concept of representation in Islamic law. 
In its general meaning, a wakeel does not have to be a person learned 
in law.  Any representative who protects the interests of another person 
is a wakeel.179  A wakeel may also be an agent who serves a principal.  
In matrimonial matters, a person representing the matrimonial interests 
of a spouse is a wakeel.  Thus, the term wakeel has not been confined to 
persons trained in law.  In the legal system, however, wakeel is a term of 
art used to describe lawyers who appear before courts and tribunals.  
With the passage of time, the term wakeel has increasingly been used to 
describe persons engaged in the practice of law.180 
Classical fiqh prefers that litigants appear in person to present their 
cases to the judge.  Jurist Abu Hanifa required that a litigant seek permission 
from his adversary before appointing a wakeel, since the introduction of 
a third party may have disturbed the equity of litigation.  However, his 
disciples did not agree with the master jurist and allowed anyone to be a 
wakeel.181  In almost all schools of jurisprudence, the appointment of 
wakeels has been available in almost all matters.  The Hanafi restrictions 
on the engagement of a wakeel are waived under necessity.  Representation 
without the adversary’s permission is allowed for a number of reasons 
dictated by practical realities.  No permission is required if the client is 
legally incompetent to present his case to the court, nor if the client is 
 
 179. Wakeel “is a person in whom one has complete faith; so much so that one can 
entrust all one’s affairs to him with full satisfaction of the heart.”  ABU ALA MAUDUDI, 
THE MEANING OF THE QURAN, sura al-Muzzammil 73:10, Desc. No.10, available at 
http://www.translatedquran.com/meaning.asp?pagetitle=AL+-+MUZZAMMIL&sno=73 
&tno=1690.  Islamic law permitted no discrimination in who could be a wakeel.  A 
Muslim may represent even non-Muslims.  Likewise, a dhimmi (non-Muslim) is allowed 
to represent Muslims.  A man may represent a woman and a woman may represent a 
man.  A master may represent the slave and a slave may represent the master.  Thus, 
representation was not burdened with any personal distinctions. 
 180. In Iran, however, the term wakeel is deeply entrenched in social memory.  For 
many centuries, the office of the wakeel al-ra-aya, or the people’s wakeel, played a real 
and a symbolic ombudsman role in protecting the indigent, the weak, and the helpless.  
In the eighteenth century—during the time of the American Revolution—Karim Khan 
Zand ruled Iran (1751–1779) on behalf of a Safavid prince.  Khan Zand first refused to 
accept any specific title, including the title of shah.  Later, however, he chose to be called 
Wakeel al-ra-aya.  J. R. Perry, Justice for the Underprivileged: The Ombudsman Tradition of 
Iran, 37 J. NEAR E. STUD. 203, 211–13 (1978).  This unique title, which the successors of 
the Khan Zand dynasty refused to adopt, was a political move on behalf of the new ruler 
to identify with the common man and provide justice and fair treatment to them.  Khan 
Zand politicized the term, suggesting that a ruler can be, and perhaps ought to be, the 
people’s representative.  JOHN R. PERRY, KARIM KHAN ZAND: A HISTORY OF IRAN, 1747–
1779, at 216 (1979).  In 1815, an Iranian visitor to London described the House of 
Commons as the House of wakula al-ra-aya—the people’s representatives.  Perry, supra 
note 180, at 212. 
 181. Ronald C. Jennings, The Office of Vekil (Wakeel) in 17th Century Ottoman 
Sharia Courts, 42 STVDIA ISLAMICA 147, 149 n.1 (1976). 
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unavailable due to illness or physical disability.  These practical needs 
reinforce the concept of wakalat or representation. 
The representation relationship between wakeel and client—muwakkil— 
has always been, and continues to be, a contract under Islamic law, 
requiring two witnesses as a legal formality for the contract’s validity.182  
The representation contract requires that the scope of wakeel’s authority 
be spelled out in the agreement.183  A client may contract with more than 
one wakeel to represent his various interests or even the same interest.  
Therefore, there exists no systemic presumption in Islamic law that a 
wakeel has the general power of attorney to dispose of all matters of his 
client.  However, the law does not prohibit clients from granting a 
general power of attorney to a designated wakeel.  Despite its contractual 
nature, the representation relationship imposes no obligation on a wakeel 
to defend the client’s interests with zeal.  The wakeel presents the client’s 
case to a judicial tribunal, in good faith, fully, and truthfully. 
Even though the concept of advocacy is deeply anchored in the Basic 
Code, advocacy skills used in the practice of law are relatively new to 
Islamic legal systems and may be attributed to Western influences.  
French jurist Emile Tyan aptly points out that advocacy has not existed 
in classical Islamic law.184  Classical fiqh viewed advocacy as an 
unacceptable, perhaps deceptive, methodology to present facts, contest 
issues, and interpret the applicable law.  The Arabic language—the 
language of the Quran and the Sunna—contains no parallel word to 
capture the special sense of the word advocacy employed in the art of 
lawyering.  In numerous Arab countries, the word wakeel means the 
lawyer, although the word muhami is also used to describe attorneys and 
advocates.  The two words are interchangeable, though muhami is a new 
coinage to capture the evolving meaning of the lawyer.185 
 
 182. Id. at 147–49.  “No advocate shall appear or act for any person in any Court or 
tribunal unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in 
writing signed by such person or his recognized agent or some other person duly 
authorized by him to make such appointment, and such document has been filed in such 
Court or tribunal.”  Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act, supra note 157, at § 22(3). 
 183. Jennings, supra note 181, at 147. 
 184. EMILE TYAN, HISTOIRE DE L’ORGNISATION JUDICIAIRE EN PAYS D’ISLAM 262 
(2d ed. 1960).  “Il n’y pas en droit musulman d’avocats, au sense special du mot.”  Id. 
(meaning “[T]here is no Islamic law of advocacy in the specific sense of the word.”). 
 185. Gamal M. Badr, Letter to the Editor, Islamic Criminal Justice, 32 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 167, 167–68 (1984) (explaining the distinction between wakeel and muhami); Ann 
Elizabeth Mayer, Letter to the Editor, Islamic Criminal Justice, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 167, 
168–69 (1984) (same). 
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Western colonialism has left deep marks on the art of lawyering in 
many Muslim countries.186  In Egypt, for example, the introduction of 
French laws and the French legal education transformed the role of 
lawyers.187  Secular courts, called Mixed Courts,188 were established in 
1875 to oust the reign of the Sharia from the colonized legal system.  
The sources of the Mixed Courts were confined to the European Codes 
adopted in Egypt, custom, natural law, and equity.  The Sharia was 
excluded as a source because the foreigners did not wish to resolve their 
disputes under the laws of the Sharia.189  With the establishment of a 
Westernized court system, the role of lawyers changed dramatically.  
Initially, the Europeans dominated the bench and the bar.  But a perpetual 
importation of lawyers and judges was unsustainable.  As such, indigenous 
lawyers were sponsored to run the Europeanized legal system.190 
After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the legal system was 
infused with the doctrine of precedent as indigenous judges learned to 
apply, distinguish, and overrule precedents.191  The introduction of the 
doctrine of precedent sharpened the advocates’ lawyering skills as they 
 
 186. Pakistan’s Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, for example, does not 
even contain the words lawyer or attorney.  Advocate is the primary word used in the 
statute.  Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act, supra note 157, at §§ 23–26.  An 
advocate is defined as a legal practitioner who is enrolled in bar records, known as rolls.  
Id. at §§ 23–25.  Persons qualified to practice law before various courts of Pakistan are 
called advocates.  Id. at § 26.  The Pakistan Supreme Court Rules employ the words 
advocates, advocates-on-record, and senior advocates who “shall be entitled to appear 
and plead before the Court on signing his respective roll.”  PAK. SUP. CT. R. IV:1–2 
(1983).  The words lawyer or attorney do not appear in the Rules. 
 187. The French domination of the Egyptian legal system attracted Coptic and 
Syrian Christians to the legal profession.  However, Muslim lawyers were needed to run 
Muslim Egypt.  This need demanded a new class of lawyers other than the traditional 
lawyers trained only in Islamic law.  See Donald M. Reid, The National Bar Association 
and Egyptian Politics, 1912–1954, 7 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 608, 611–12 (1974).  
There is some controversy over whether the new word muhami represents a new class of 
professional lawyers trained in the Western tradition or whether it is interchangeable 
with the classical word wakil.  See Gamal M. Badar & Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Letters to 
the Editor, Islamic Criminal Justice, 32 AM. J. COMP. L 167, 167–69 (1984). 
 188. See JASPER YEATES BRINTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT 33 (rev. ed. 1968).  
The Mixed Courts resolved the disputes between foreigners and Egyptians and among 
foreigners.  Disputes among Egyptians were resolved through Native courts.  The two 
court systems were merged into National courts in 1949.  A new Civil Code under the 
leadership of Ahmed al-Sanhouri was drafted.  See Mark S. W. Hoyle, The Mixed Courts 
of Egypt: An Anniversary Assessment, 1 ARAB L.Q. 60, 61 (1985). 
 189. These courts were designed to stem the proliferation of frivolous and inflated 
claims that the foreigners were making against the Egyptian government.  These courts, 
however, were a constant reminder to the natives that a foreign legal system had been 
planted in their soil. 
 190. FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN 
EGYPT 33 (1968).  The first Egyptian law school was established in 1868.  The Court 
system, fashioned after the Anglo-French model, became operational in 1884. 
 191. See Hoyle, supra note 188, at 63. 
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learned to actively engage the legal materials and find solutions through 
interpretation rather than an intuitive sense of justice.  The task of a 
muhami thus became to aggressively argue the best interests of his 
client.  The doctrine of precedent also introduced the novel idea that the 
absence of written law is no bar to seeking remedies, because judges can 
always manipulate old cases to develop appropriate remedies suited to 
new causes of action.192  Thus, lawyering was introduced into the 
enterprise of the Egyptian legal system.  In the succeeding decades, a 
more nationalist Egypt would discard many foreign sources of law and 
adopt the Islamic law as one of its founding sources.  Despite this 
change in the substantive law, the advocacy skills that the Europeans 
introduced into the system would become a more permanent feature of 
the system.193  In others parts of the Muslim world, the concept of 
advocacy and the word advocate have entered with great acceptance. 
B.  The Obedience Doctrine 
Soon after the Prophet’s death in 632 A.D., conquering Muslims were 
successful in establishing their own empires.  They needed the doctrine 
of obedience to establish peace and order.  This doctrine preached that 
Muslims must obey the rulers charged with authority.  Obedience of 
laws is critical for the establishment of social order.  Communities face 
permanent anarchy if the people are acculturated to challenge authority 
and refuse to obey laws considered incompatible with perceived self 
interests.  The obedience doctrine, meant to minimize rebellions, chilled 
the development of reformist advocacy. 
The support for the obedience doctrine was drawn from the Basic 
Code, the Quran and the Sunna.194  The Quran commands Muslims: “O 
 
 192. Id. at 63–64. 
 193. In the Turkish language, the word wakeel—spelled as vekil—means an 
attorney or agent, and the Turkish word vekaletname, meaning the power of attorney, is 
derived from the word wakeel.  Jennings, supra note 181, at 147.  However, the Turkish 
word avukat is used to describe attorneys and advocates.  In Persian and Urdu, the word 
wakeel is the primary word to describe attorneys, advocates, and lawyers.  In India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the word advocate has been imported to accommodate the 
modern techniques of lawyering.  In these countries, however, the word wakeel also has 
come to acquire the advocacy dimension.  As such, the words advocate and wakeel are 
used synonymously, and the word wakeel, though derived from the language of the 
Quran, has acquired some negative connotations associated with the word lawyer. 
 194. IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS, AL-MUWATTA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS, bk. 21 No. 
21.1.5, at 173 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley trans., 1989). 
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ye who believe!  Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged 
with authority among you.”195  This verse was revealed when the Prophet 
appointed a commander to an army detachment,196 signaling to Muslim 
soldiers that obeying the appointed commander was essential for maintaining 
discipline of the armed forces.  The Prophet’s Sunna reinforces the Quran’s 
commandment.  The Prophet instructed Muslims “to listen to the ruler 
and obey him in adversity and prosperity, in pleasure and displeasure, 
and even when another person is given (rather undue) preference over 
you.”197  The Prophet reinforced obedience to the rulers on the occasion 
of the Last Pilgrimage saying: “If a slave is appointed over you and he 
conducts your affairs according to the Book of Allah, you should listen 
to him and obey (his orders).”198 
The Prophet’s Sunna, read in light of the Quran, clarifies elements of 
the obedience doctrine.  First, social and economic grievances cannot be 
the basis to disobey the ruler.  It is easier for individuals and communities to 
obey rulers in times of social prosperity.  But blaming the rulers is also 
common when natural or man-made disasters hit communities, disrupting 
the normalcy of life.  In adverse times, such as famines, epidemics, and 
economic downturns, the Prophet’s Sunna mandates that Muslims continue 
to obey the rulers.  Obedience to the ruler is required even if the ruler 
practices discrimination and preferences.  Demands for equal treatment 
cannot be the grounds for disobeying the rulers.  Islamic enlightenment 
imposes the obligation to maintain social order.  If a Muslim disapproves of 
something done by the ruler, the Prophet recommended patience and 
not rebellion, since disrespect for rulers had been an artifact of the law of 
ignorance.199 
Second, the Prophet’s Sunna democratizes the ruling class.  It rejects 
the notion that only the houses of royalty, nobility, and powerful people 
are entitled to rule Muslim communities.  Muslims must obey rulers 
even if rulers are slaves appointed in positions of authority.  This 
democratization of the ruling class stands in contradistinction to the 
Greek ideology, for example, under which the ruler and the ruled belong 
to two different human species.200  The Prophet’s Sunna also rejects the 
caste system under which higher castes rule and lower castes perform 
 
 195. QURAN, sura al-Nisa 4:59. 
 196. 6 SAHIH AL-BUKHAHRI, supra note 49, Book of Commentary 60:108, at 89; 3 
SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 54, Kitab al-Imara 20:4517, at 1230. 
 197. 3 SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 54, Kitab al-Imara 20:4524, at 1230. 
 198. Id. at 20:4528. 
 199. 9 SAHIH AL-BUKHAHRI, supra note 49, Book of Afflictions 88:176–77, at 145–
46. 
 200. Ali Khan, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289, 295 
(2001). 
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menial jobs on intergenerational bases.  The appointment of rulers on 
ethnic, social, economic, racial, or any such basis is prohibited under 
Islamic law.  This nondiscrimination among rulers deepens respect for 
authority and demolishes the mindset that only powerful people are 
entitled to be heads of the community.  When offices of authority are 
reserved for a ruling class pre-identified on the basis of social hierarchy, 
the system produces resentment, rebellion, and instability. 
Islam’s strong preference for egalitarian leadership, however, does not 
protect incompetent or oppressive rulers.  Although the obedience doctrine 
recommends patience when a ruler does something disagreeable, reformist 
advocacy to peacefully remove unwanted rulers is still compatible with 
this doctrine.  The obedience doctrine is addressed to the people, not 
rulers.  The rulers must be just and caring.  They must work hard for the 
welfare of communities.  In fact, the obedience doctrine presupposes that 
the rulers are God-fearing Muslims who conduct affairs of the community 
not in accordance with personal preferences but the law of spiritual 
intelligence revealed in the Basic Code.  The obedience doctrine must be 
understood in the context of checks and balances.  It must not be interpreted 
to confer unlimited powers on rulers or to shield their oppression from 
reformist advocacy.  The obedience doctrine does not convert Muslim 
communities into fatalistic herds who must bear excesses of the regime 
without protest. 
Accordingly, the Basic Code does not sponsor rigid obedience without 
exceptions.  The Quran allows Muslims to unite against fitnatun fee 
alardi—oppression on earth—and fasadun kabeerun—great corruption.201  
Oppression and corruption, however, are serious charges.  They cannot 
be diluted to mean minor acts of discrimination or corruption.  The unity 
against oppression and corruption is not restricted to fighting non-
Muslim rulers; it also applies to resisting Muslim rulers.  In fact, the 
perpetration of oppression is so offensive to Islamic teachings that 
Muslims are allowed to fight the oppressors without worrying about 
bloodshed, provided no peaceful means are available to remove the ruler 
or otherwise remove the oppression.  This militancy against oppressive 
rulers, Muslim or non-Muslim, has been the defining attribute of Islam. 
Jurisprudentially, the obedience doctrine does not overrule reformist 
advocacy.  Al-Ghazali notes that a cruel and unjust ruler is liable to be 
 
 201. QURAN, sura al-Anfal 8:73. 
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removed from office.202  However, even the removal of a bad ruler may 
lead to chaos and anarchy.  If the forced removal of a ruler is likely to 
cause social disorder, al-Ghazali prefers that Muslims bear the ruler’s 
injustices rather than rebel against him.203  But al-Ghazali leaves out the 
middle option of reformist advocacy.  A bad ruler may be tolerated for 
preserving social order, but his policies and laws may still be resisted 
through reformist advocacy. 
The Quran distinguishes between communities on the basis of the law 
by which they govern themselves.  Some communities seek the law of 
ignorance—hukum al jahiliyyati—others the law of moral intelligence.204  
Historically, the law of ignorance refers to the law of pre-Islamic tribes 
in Arabia.  Conceptually, however, the law of ignorance denies the existence 
of moral intelligence, defends hierarchies and inequities, promotes 
hedonistic lifestyles, asserts the power of the ruler or the ruling elites, 
and justifies predatory aggression against the weak and the helpless.  
The law of ignorance is often derived from “opinions, desires and 
customs” inconsistent with God’s commandments.205 
According to the Prophet’s Sunna, Muslims are under no obligation to 
obey a ruler who practices open kufr—disbelief.206  Kufr is the resurrection 
of the law of ignorance.  However, the allegations of kufr are easy to 
launch, particularly in areas of unsettled jurisprudence.  Muslim communities 
will suffer unending chaos if popular rebellion were allowed for the 
ruler’s minor or private discretions of faith.  For example, rebellion 
would be unjustified if a ruler is rumored to drink alcohol in privacy but 
refrains from drinking in public.  But if a ruler openly defies the 
fundamentals of Islam, Muslim communities decline to submit to his 
regime.  Pious and just rulers are entitled to obedience but even imperfect 
rulers deserve to be obeyed for the welfare of the community as a whole.  
The obedience to the ruler, however, must never be confused with 
obedience to his laws of ignorance.  Reformist advocacy supplies an 
effective tool in fighting kufr, without toppling the ruler. 
C.  Jurisprudential Cutting Edge 
Reformist advocacy by its very nature thrives on the cutting edge.  It 
supplies dynamism to the enterprise of law.  Islamic law protected its 
initial dynamism by establishing the free markets of fiqh—Islamic 
 
 202. 2 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 48, at 226. 
 203. Id. 
 204. QURAN, sura al-Maidah 5:50. 
 205. 3 TAFSIR IBN KATHIR 202 (Shaykh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2003). 
 206. 9 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, Book of Afflictions 88:178, at 146. 
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jurisprudence.207  These free markets first strengthened and later weakened 
the cutting edge of reformist advocacy.  Free markets strengthened 
advocacy because they allowed jurists a free mind to interpret the Basic 
Code, the Quran and the Sunna, to find solutions to new legal issues that 
arose in real and hypothetical cases.  Great jurists arose in different parts 
of the Islamic Empire who refused to become part of the official 
administration of justice.  This refusal was primarily motivated by a 
desire to preserve juristic freedom to interpret the Basic Code without 
pressure from the Caliph.208  The Empire needed judges to resolve cases.  
But private justice was also available to litigants.209  Different schools of 
jurisprudence offered different solutions to same problems.  This jurisprudential 
diversity, however, was territorialized.  The prominent schools began to 
be associated with distinct parts of the Empire.  In the seventh century 
Iraq, for example, the Abu Hanifa school of jurisprudence emerged as 
the dominant school whereas in contemporary Medina, the Maliki school 
of jurisprudence earned great following.  Minor schools of jurisprudence 
also arose.  In the free markets of fiqh, however, the influence of a juristic 
school depended on the number of followers.210 
Paradoxically, free markets also weakened the concept of advocacy as 
a reformist doctrine.  Minor schools of fiqh that offered radical solutions 
to social ills were ineffective because very few people followed their 
teachings, thus major schools with large followings had internal constraints 
not to offer a legal viewpoint that might diminish the school’s prestige 
and leadership.  Furthermore, new solutions and the legal methods by 
which new solutions were found, had to also fit with the school’s 
methodology and normative perspectives.  If a jurist within a certain 
school offered a radical departure from the existing jurisprudence, he 
was simply ignored even within the school itself.  As the jurisprudence 
of a school matured, it became increasingly difficult to repudiate its core 
methodology or social and economic perspectives.  A radical departure 
from the school was also difficult because each school’s fiqh was 
considered part of the Sharia, God’s Laws, and the Prophet’s Sunna.  
 
 207. Liaquat Ali Khan, Free Markets of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1487, 1488. 
 208. Unlike common law that was cultivated primarily in courts of law, Islamic law 
developed in the chambers of pious jurists. 
 209. If litigants followed a certain jurist, they were often willing, without coercion, 
to resolve their dispute according to his jurisprudence. 
 210. See Khan, supra note 7, at 363–65. 
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Thus, each school’s jurisprudence acquired a mystique of immutability, 
ignoring the distinctions between the revealed and man-made sources.  
The Basic Code is immutable.  But immutability was also becoming a 
characteristic of fiqh.  Islamic law began to lose touch with an ever dynamic 
evolution of human life.211 
D.  Militancy 
Ever since the Islamic tradition has arisen from its historical inertia 
and entered into the second era of ijtihad,212 zealous advocacy has morphed 
into zealotry.  A new militancy has begun to define Islam.  This militancy 
no longer subscribes to the obedience doctrine.  It is willing to challenge 
and rebel against rulers who refuse to defend the goals of militancy.  
Militancy wishes to liberate Muslim communities from internal and 
external rulers who marginalize Islam and enforce secularism. 
In some Muslim communities, the quest for liberation has descended 
into cyclical vengeance.  Aggression has become a preferred tool to 
advocate viewpoints.  Militant protectors of the Basic Code—the Quran 
and the Prophet’s Sunnah—trust no secular system.  Suffering from a 
siege mentality, they have lost faith in secular laws, rulers, and courts.  
Peaceful interpretations of the Basic Code are misunderstood as appeasements 
and compromises to what they call morally bankrupt secularism, foreign 
rule, and neocolonialism.  Justice, they believe, cannot be obtained 
through persuasion and mild manners.  Furthermore, obsessive militancy 
thrives on the partisan passion to interpret the Quran, the Sunnah, and 
the classical fiqh in a manner convenient to advance self-righteous 
ideologies.  Fierce portraits of Islam distort Islam’s core spirituality that 
is inherently powerful to disarm injustice through the generosity of spirit 
and knowledge.  Zealotry ignores that the very first revelation of the 
Quran illuminated persuasive power of the pen, and not sword.213  It 
forgets that scholars, and not warriors, are the heirs of the Prophet. 
Reformist advocacy is not synonymous with militancy.  It means fighting 
laws with laws.  Islam most certainly restrains the sword to behead an 
imperfect ruler.  But it does not restrain lawyers to argue against 
inequities and injustices.  Zealous advocacy as a rhetorical weapon may 
summon the people to overthrow an unjust ruler.  This use of advocacy, 
however, must be restricted to most extreme circumstances of cruelty 
and injustice.  Most often, zealous advocacy is a legal tool to reform the 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. QURAN, sura al-Alaq 96:4.  The first five verses of this sura were revealed to 
Prophet Muhammad in 610 CE in the Hira Cave, near Makka.  These five verses were 
the first revelation of the Quran. 
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laws of ignorance and their effects.  Fighting injustices by means of law 
most certainly threatens the ruler’s ego and power.  A ruler determined 
to enforce unjust laws he has promulgated may not tolerate challenges to 
his authority, and rarely does a ruler accept that he is unjust.  Most cruel 
rulers are self-righteous and highly regard their policies and notions of 
justice.  Zealous advocacy, even if it were to be used in courts of law, 
might be offensive to such rulers who may persecute lawyers and judges 
who use legal methodologies to weaken the ruler’s authority.  Since 
zealous advocacy subverts injustices, lawyers and judges may adopt 
appropriate strategies that weaken the reign of cruelty without inviting 
the ruler’s wrath. 
If fighting is allowed to erase wrongs, peaceful advocacy in courts of 
law to annul the laws of ignorance cannot be prohibited.  Opposition to 
the laws of ignorance does not have to be bloody.  It can be translated 
into legal methodologies to fight wrongdoers through courts and tribunals.  
The path of ease argues for peaceful and law-based methods to dismantle 
injustices.  Muslim communities suffer hardship when disputes are 
resolved through bloodshed.  The Quran declares in clear terms that 
“God wills that you shall have ease, and does not will you to suffer 
hardship.”214  God helps those who find easy solutions to the problems, 
easy solutions that do not lay heavy burdens on the people.  “And God 
will make it easy for you when you follow the path of ease.”215  Ibn 
Kathir interprets this verse to suggest that God promises to make the law 
“that is easy, tolerant, straight and just, with no crookedness, difficulty 
or hardship in it.”216  The Prophet’s Sunna also recommends finding 
easy solutions to problems that incite agitation and strong emotions.217 
VI.  ADVOCACY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In common law, litigation remained the primary method of developing 
and refining rules of law.  Even when common law entered the age of 
statutes and legislatures began to freely engineer social forces, lawmaking 
 
 214. Id. at sura al-Baqara 2:185. 
 215. Id. at sura al A’la 87:8. 
 216. 10 TAFSIR IBN KATHIR, supra note 205, at 449. 
 217. 8 SAHIH AL-BUKHAHRI, supra note 49, Book of Afflictions 73:149, at 93–94.  
When a Bedouin urinated in the mosque, some Muslims rushed to beat him.  The 
Prophet ordered Muslims to leave the Bedouin alone and wash the spot with water.  The 
Prophet then said, “You have been sent to make things easy (for the people) and you 
have not been sent to make things difficult for them.”  Id. 
KHAN.DOC 9/4/2008  11:40:06 AM 
 
588 
through courts refused to go away.  As such, zealous advocacy suffered 
no loss.  However, the singular duty to the client was no longer tied to 
notions of social justice.  As the United States rose to prominence and 
assumed leadership among common law countries, its social and cultural 
paradigm of enlightened self interest further weakened a communitarian 
view of justice.  A major shift occurred in the notion of zealous 
advocacy.  The reformist role of zealous advocacy was no longer its 
central motif.  The lawyer is an advocate and not a judge.  He must not 
pass judgments on the justice or injustice of his client’s claims nor must 
he evaluate those claims on the standard of morality.  The lawyer must 
argue his client’s case within the bounds of law and let the notions of 
justice fall where they might.  The doctrine of zealous advocacy shifted 
from its reformist origins to an amoral artistry defending claims of the 
client. 
In 1803, years before Henry Brougham articulated the concept of 
zealous advocacy, the United States had put in place the promising 
doctrine of judicial review in the holding of Marbury v. Madison,218 
declaring that Congress could not pass laws contrary to the Constitution.  
The doctrine was a revolutionary departure from the common law 
tradition under which the Parliament “can make any laws it thinks fit.”219  
The Marbury holding did establish the rule of constitution by 
empowering judges to scrutinize and even invent social policy.  It was, 
however, a double-edged sword.  With one edge, it weakened the 
democratic principles under which the people’s representatives may 
embrace notions of justice through legislative means, since the courts 
could declare legislation unconstitutional.220  The other edge provided a 
cutter to trim the excesses of a majoritarian and utilitarian lawmaking.  
With one edge, the judges could now use the Constitution to preserve 
power relations, as did Justice Taney in Dred Scott.221  With the other 
edge, they could dismantle social injustices, reversing law-based inequitable 
power relations, as in Brown v. Board of Education.222  Unmindful of the 
future impact of the Marbury holding on power relations, the passionate 
 
 218. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 219. Nicholas Aroney, Politics, Law and the Constitution in McCawley’s Case, 30 
MELB. U. L. REV. 605, 635 (2006).  The Privy Council even asserted that Australia, 
unlike the United States, has no conception of judicial review. 
 220. Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional 
Law, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (1986).  “The usual line of present day constitutional 
conservatives is that where the preferences of the framers are not clear, judges should 
defer to the elected branches.”  Id. at 290. 
 221. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856). 
 222. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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rhetoric at the time of its invention was for the most part reactionary, 
vividly employed in the service of states’ rights.223 
The doctrine of judicial review is a grand invitation to substantive 
zeal, but has little to do with courtroom demeanor.  It unleashed tremendous 
professional energy for lawyers to challenge laws, including the ones 
duly passed through democratic processes.  In mid-nineteenth century 
America, lawyers began to challenge government policies, congressional 
laws, and even provisions of the U.S. Constitution with a degree of 
substantive zeal224 unknown in Great Britain, where Brougham spoke his 
famous words.  Initially, however, few could perceive the connections 
between reformist advocacy and judicial review.  The two concepts 
flowed apart from each other, as if they could not be combined to correct 
inequitable power relations.  In fact, the post-Marbury legal profession 
in America was skeptical of Brougham’s zealous advocacy. 
A.  From Brougham to Sharswood 
Describing Brougham’s “justly celebrated defense of the Queen,” George 
Sharswood dismissed Brougham’s famous words as “extravagant, . . . 
led by the excitement of so great an occasion, . . . what cool reflection 
and sober reason certainly never can approve.”225  Unlike Brougham 
who lived and loved viva activa, Sharswood was an establishmentarian, 
a law professor, a high court judge, enjoying viva contemplativa, a man 
who viewed society and government as indispensable prerequisites for 
the happiness of the individual.  “It is for no vain national power or glory, 
for no experimental abstraction,” believed Sharswood, “that governments 
are instituted among men.”226  Instead of seeing society and government 
as potentially oppressive structures, as did Brougham, Sharswood argued 
that “without society—and government, which of course results from 
it—men would not be free.”227 
 
 223. ERIC H. WALTHER, THE FIRE-EATERS 123 (1992).  In the Nullification Crisis, a 
radical South Carolinian, Robert Barnwell Rhett, exclaimed that “[i]mpotent resistance 
will add vengeance to [one’s] ruin.”  Id. 
 224. Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 
U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 393 (1999) (explaining how the courts ignored monetary clauses of 
the Constitution that prohibited the issuance of paper money and had declared gold and 
silver coin to be legal tender). 
 225. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 86–87. 
 226. Id. at 16. 
 227. Id. 
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Sharswood’s assessment of Brougham, however, fails to see the historical 
context in which Brougham lived and argued.228  Sharswood also 
failed to see unjust power relations that Brougham was determined to 
dismantle.  Brougham’s Imperial Britain was in need of serious reforms.  
But so was Sharswood’s United States. 
Sharswood was born, raised, and schooled in a city, Philadelphia, 
which had been the nerve-center of the American Revolution.229  If 
Brougham was imbued with a reformist spirit, Sharswood was raised 
with fond memories of the American Revolution and the role his hometown 
had played in the movement for independence.  Brougham was a rebel, 
skeptical of patriotism.  Sharswood was a patriot and a conservative with 
no plans to challenge unjust power relations that existed in the United 
States during Sharswood’s professional life in law—1831–1882.230 
Sharswood could have embraced Brougham’s zealous advocacy as a 
reformist doctrine, for Sharswood lived to see great injustices outside 
and inside the realm of law.  In 1830, a year before Sharswood was 
admitted to practice law, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act to 
relocate tens of thousands of Indians from their ancestral lands.  In 1838, 
the forcible removal of Cherokees to Oklahoma caused numerous 
deaths, an episode known as the Trail of Tears.  In 1856, Chief Justice 
Roger Taney declared that sons and daughters of black Africans, slave or 
free, were not citizens of the United States.231  In 1872, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld Illinois’s exclusion of women from admission to 
the state bar, pontificating that “the paramount destiny and mission of 
woman” are the offices of wife and mother.232  In 1882, a year before 
Sharswood retired, the Chinese Exclusion Act outlawed all Chinese 
immigration and denied citizenship to all Chinese living in the United 
States. 
 
 228. James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2443–46 (2003). 
 229. The meetings of the Second Continental Congress to defend the rights of 
Americans took place in Philadelphia’s State House (Independence Hall).  ALAN BRINKLEY, 
AMERICAN HISTORY 152 (10th ed., McGraw Hill 1999).  In 1787, the Constitutional 
Convention was held in Philadelphia.  Id. at 196.  From 1790 to 1800, Philadelphia 
served as the capital of the United States.  Id. at 206, 238. 
 230. In 1831, Sharswood was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  History of Penn Law, http://www.law.upenn.edu/about/history/medallions/ 
sharswood/index.html.  In 1882, he retired as the Chief Justice from the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania.  Id. 
 231. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1856).  Pennsylvanians, 
however, had abolished slavery in the state, resisted the enforcement of Federal Fugitive 
Slave Law, and valiantly fought in the Civil War.  Nearly 350,000 Pennsylvanians, 
including 8600 African Americans, joined the Union Forces.  LARRY D. MANSCH, 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, PRESIDENT ELECT 179 (2005). 
 232. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873). 
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American courts have been critical of Brougham’s zealous advocacy.  
Some misinterpret Brougham’s purposes and intentions.  In 1870, New 
York Judge John Hackett was the first American judge to mention Henry 
Brougham’s famous statement in a reported U.S. case.233  In giving 
instructions to the jury in a murder case, Hackett said, “I do not say 
whether I approve or disapprove of it—I state it as the extreme view, and 
one which any counsel for defense might adopt with conscientious belief 
in it.”234  But judge and jury, warns Hackett, “must discriminate only the 
evidence, amid zealous means and zealous expedients.”235  Judge Hackett 
seemed to have a soft corner for the Brougham type of conscientious 
commitment to the client’s defense.  But he feared that the lawyer’s zeal 
might distort the evidence.  It might.  But reformist advocacy need not 
confuse the evidence of crime.  Confusing evidence is no zealous advocacy.  
It is an ethical transgression.  But if the defense attorney fights against 
capital punishment, he engages in advocacy as a reformist calling.  For 
now his purpose is not to muffle the reality of murder but to argue that a 
state must not extinguish life in the name of justice. 
In 1995, Circuit Judge Jacobs McLaughlin declared that Henry 
Brougham “was an early apostle of what today would be known as 
Rambo litigation tactics.”236  This characterization of Brougham is 
contrary to Brougham’s efforts, intentions, and purposes.  Brougham 
was not an offensive tactician.  He was a man imbued with reformist 
substance, determined to effect social reform through the rule of law.  
He defended clients to undo larger social injustices.  By way of criticism, 
Judge McLaughlin narrated a story of the English Chief Justice who 
delivered a speech at a dinner for barristers, with the eighty-six-year-old 
Lord Brougham in the audience, and said that a lawyer must “reconcile 
the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of truth and 
justice.”237  The Chief Justice’s speech did draw applause from the audience, 
as Judge McLaughlin points out.  But this applause was as much, if not 
more, for Brougham who devoted his life to promote truth and justice 
for his clients as well as for the working class people and their children. 
Supporting Brougham’s cause-oriented advocacy, Sharswood argued 
that the “noblest faculty of the [legal] profession [is] to counsel the 
 
 233. McFarland’s Trial, 8 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 57, 87–88 (1870). 
 234. Id. at 87. 
 235. Id. at 88. 
 236. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 237. Id. at 841 (quoting 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 941 (1947)). 
KHAN.DOC 9/4/2008  11:40:06 AM 
 
592 
ignorant, defend the weak and oppressed, and to stand forth on all occasions 
as the bulwark of private rights against the assaults of power.”238  
Sharswood described three intertwined “fidelities” that the lawyer must 
hold at the same time: “fidelity to the court, fidelity to the client, [and] 
fidelity to the claims of truth and honor.”239 
Section 10 of the Proposed Alabama Code of Legal Ethics, the first 
American code of ethics and derived from Sharswood’s Essay, upholds 
the principle of “warm zeal in the maintenance . . . of [the client’s] 
cause.”240  However, the Code beseeches lawyers to dispel the public 
prejudice against lawyers as a class that originates from a “false claim”; 
the attorney’s duty requires that he “do everything to succeed in his 
client’s cause.”241  Assuming that all lawyers believe in God, the Alabama 
Code reminds them that “[t]he attorney’s office does not destroy man’s 
accountability to the Creator.”242  Just like Islamic law, the Alabama 
Code allows a lawyer of faith to represent his client with God-
consciousness: a consciousness that must be at peace with itself while 
advocating a case.243  In preserving the attorney’s existential integrity, 
the Alabama Code does not compel a lawyer to fight for a cause in 
which he has no moral stake. 
Despite the presence of God-consciousness in the early history of 
American professional ethics, a powerful dichotomy was introduced to 
separate internal and external ethics.  Sharswood argued that a lawyer is 
not responsible for the client’s “unjust cause.”244  The lawyer who 
refuses his professional assistance because the client’s case is unjust 
“usurps the functions of both judge and jury.”245  Under this theory, the 
lawyer must separate his existential values from his professional values.  
The lawyer may disagree with the client’s cause and still offer representation.  
Professional ethics were now gathering a new meaning.  They would 
weaken the notion of lawyer’s self-righteousness and expand the right of 
representation; for, otherwise, a self-righteous bar would refuse to 
represent some causes and some clients.  This positive development toward 
universal representation, however, would occur at the expense of 
separating the lawyer’s heart from the mind.  This distance from the 
client’s cause, warns Sharswood, does not mean that “all causes are to be 
 
 238. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 53–54. 
 239. Id. at 58. 
 240. DRINKER, supra note 152, at 355.  See also H.M.B., supra note 15, at 320 
(discussing Section 10). 
 241. DRINKER, supra note 152, at 355. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See supra Part IV.C. 
 244. SHARSWOOD, supra note 14, at 83. 
 245. Id. at 84. 
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taken.”246  Sharswood grants lawyers the discretion to decline causes but 
the discretion must be exercised wisely and justly.247 
B.  Artistic Advocacy 
Perhaps energized by the separation of internal and external ethics, 
common law gave birth to what might be called artistic advocacy.  
Artistic advocacy is amoral and case neutral.  It may be employed to 
defend any cause.  Instead of focusing on morality of the cause, artistic 
advocacy is preoccupied with dynamics of the audience, be it court or 
jury.  It wishes to influence the designated audience to obtain favorable 
outcomes.  The first lessons of artistic advocacy came from Aristotle,248 
the Greek philosopher whose works early Muslim jurists incorporated 
into the analytical structures of Islamic jurisprudence.  According to 
Aristotle, a good advocate possesses a keen sense of the hearers, for the 
audience determines the success or failure of the advocate’s goals.249 
Artistic advocacy knows its audience.  Expressing in a more proactive 
language, Aristotle speaks of this awareness as putting the audience 
“into the right frame of mind.”250  The advocate must communicate with 
the audience as if he himself is a member of the audience, speaking the 
same language, thinking the same thought, holding the same fears, 
seeing the same prejudice, nurturing the same hope, and tilting toward 
the same outcome.  A profound contact with the audience is the advocate’s 
first challenge.  This contact must not only be made but also maintained 
through the entire life of the case.  An advocate who fails to nurture deep 
connections with the audience is alienated and his advocacy remains 
fruitless, since it is always the audience—judge or jury—that rewards 
advocacy.  If the nature of the case is such that the audience is predisposed 
to favor a particular position, a good advocate defending the “wrong 
position” uses his skills to neutralize the bias of the audience.  Of course, 
no good advocate would deliberately offend the audience even if it were 
conspicuously prejudiced toward his position. 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2237, 2265 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).  Aristotle uses the phrase forensic advocacy to describe 
what I call artistic advocacy. 
 249. Id. at 2194. 
 250. Id. 
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Language is a huge part of artistic advocacy.  In fact, language is so 
critical to artistic advocacy that some commentators may even confuse 
artistic advocacy with mere linguistic skills.  In law, it is important for 
an advocate to be able to speak both the technical and lay language with 
fluency and accuracy.  The knowledge of the technical language empowers 
an advocate to demonstrate to the court and other lawyers that he 
understands the case in its legal framework.  The knowledge of the lay 
language, which includes the ability to translate complex legal issues 
into the daily language of the common man, endears the advocate to the 
jury, the client, the lay audience in the courtroom, and a broader 
audience elsewhere.  An attorney without this linguistic skill fails either 
to persuade the judge or the jury, the professional or the lay crowd.  An 
effective advocate possesses at least two tongues, one for the profession, 
and the other for the public.  In cases of public importance, the two 
tongues of the advocate are essential for bridging the gap between the 
people and legal professionals. 
Artistic advocacy, nonetheless, does not throw away the lawyer’s 
personal character.  As explained in Part IV, both Islam and common 
law affirm that the advocate’s character is critical to the efficacy of 
advocacy.  Even in Greek philosophy, trustworthy character is an advocate’s 
most valuable asset.  Aristotle explains this point as follows: “We 
believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true 
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact 
certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.”251  Contrarian writers 
hold, says Aristotle, that substance of advocacy rather than character of 
the advocate persuades an audience.252  Disagreeing with these writers, 
Aristotle maintains that personal goodness is the most effective means of 
persuasion that an advocate possesses.253  Particularly in matters where 
opinions are divided, the speaker’s character is an absolute factor.254 
Aristotle’s thesis that advocacy is persuasion that affects decision 
makers fails to tell us what persuasion means.  Persuasion can be highly 
useful if it informs coherently and honestly.  But persuasion can also 
slide into manipulation, which is problematic for both pragmatic and 
ethical reasons.  Pragmatically, manipulation as an effort to change 
someone’s mind may backfire and may indeed repel decision makers.  
Ethically, manipulation accords no respect to the audience and uses the 
audience as a means to achieve an end.  Manipulation may also turn into 
undue influence.  Lawful persuasion does not destroy free agency of the 
 
 251. Id. at 2155. 
 252. See id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Aristotle with approval). 
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person persuaded, whereas undue influence manipulates a person to do 
something against her will.255 
Artistic advocacy is a cultural value that emerges from and thrives in 
the sensibilities of a community.  Two major cultural factors support 
artistic advocacy.  First, a culture in which theatrical skills are broadly 
disseminated and practiced appreciates and expects dramatic advocacy.256  
Second, a culture in which individuals, groups, and corporations may 
vociferously assert their interests develops a high tolerance for theatrics 
in law.257 
Theatrical skills allow a person to play a role—to feel, act, speak, and 
behave like someone else.  They also teach awareness of an audience.  
An actor playing Hamlet must express the emotions—anger, confusion, 
and disappointment—that Hamlet feels over the death of his father.  The 
actor’s own father may be alive and well and he may have no uncle who 
has betrayed his father and married his mother.  Yet, the actor must own 
the story of the play and agonize throughout the play as if his father has 
indeed been killed.  This actor’s negative capability to be someone else 
is the ultimate achievement of successful theater.258 
A sophisticated audience does not suspend moral judgments about the 
play or characters that appear in the play.  But it does not see, much less 
judge, actors and actresses through the moral prism.  The audience will 
applaud an actor playing villainous Claudius well without confusing the 
actor with Claudius, the character whom the audience might despise.  
 
 255. Andrews v. Rentz, 470 S.E.2d 669, 671 (Ga. 1996) (citing Ehlers v. Rheinberger, 
49 S.E.2d 535, 540 (Ga. 1948)). 
 256. See Michael Kirby, On Acting and Not-Acting, DRAMA REV., Mar. 1972, at 3 
(explaining the continuum between acting and non-acting).  Artistic advocacy blossoms 
in cultures where theater is held in high value.  Few human beings are innately gifted 
with theatrical skills, which enable persons to express themselves through self-confident 
and clear speech purposefully manufactured not simply to be heard, but appreciated and 
possibly applauded.  The same can be said about gestures.  Although gestures are natural 
in human behavior and can be found even in the communication of newborn babies, 
theatrical gestures are learned behavior.  Like theatrical speech, theatrical gestures 
convey meaning, interpret events, and sometimes furnish more profound insights into a 
situation than do spoken words.  Although effective acting is said to be natural and less 
contrived, acting is nonetheless the employment of theatrical skills in communication. 
 257. Although Islamic norms resist theatrical advocacy in law, the al-Qaeda video 
tapes aimed at the Western audience are often prepared with theatrical efficacy. 
 258. John Keats, an English poet, invented the term negative capability, meaning 
the capability to be in uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts without irritation.  Letter from 
John Keats to George & Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), in THE LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 
71 (Maurice Buxton Forman ed., 4th ed. 1952). 
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Thus, a sophisticated audience develops negative capability too.  While 
the actors playing Hamlet or Claudius may suspend their own personal 
lives, the audience need not do that.  However, the audience must distinguish 
actors from characters to enjoy the play.  Without this double negative 
capability, the theater cannot develop as an art form. 
Artistic advocacy in law mimics stage acting.  Both art forms are 
aimed at specific audiences.  Stage acting informs and thrills a crowd in 
the theater; artistic advocacy informs and thrills a crowd in the courtroom.  
Actors and advocates face similar challenges.  On the stage, some actors 
play heroes, some villains, and some complex characters.  In the courtroom, 
some lawyers represent clients whom the audience is predisposed to like, 
some represent villainous clients, and some more complex.  Both actors 
and advocates work for applause.  Actors must do well for success of the 
play, advocates for success of the case.259 
Just as in theater, negative capability is a huge part of advocacy in 
law.  The lawyer is an actor who owns the story of the case and plays his 
part without moral anguish.  Judges, as the sophisticated audience, understand 
that the lawyer is playing a role and that they should not confuse the 
 
 259. In recent years, a remarkable display of artistic advocacy was staged for the 
world when Johnnie Cochran defended O.J. Simpson, who was accused of murdering his 
ex-wife.  Cochran spoke to millions of television viewers in the world.  But his real 
audience was the Los Angeles downtown jury, composed of nine blacks, two whites, and 
one Hispanic.  The background facts were most relevant to the trial.  Both Cochran and 
Simpson were African Americans.  The murdered ex-wife was white.  So was the chief 
prosecutor.  The judge was Japanese American.  This racial panorama sensationalized 
the trial.  A profound prejudice that paints blacks as a violent group lurked behind the 
trial as Cochran defended Simpson.  The task of defending Simpson was Herculean: 
soon after the murder and before the trial, millions of people had watched, live on 
television, Simpson fleeing from the police in a chase on the Los Angeles highways—a 
presumed footage of guilt. 
Throughout the trial, Cochran remained deferential to the jury.  He did not take the 
black jurors for granted, nor did he ignore the Hispanic and white jurors.  In humanizing 
the trial and softening the line between prosecution and defense, Cochran expressed 
feelings of sorrow for the grieving families.  But the masterstroke of his advocacy 
focused on building a relationship of trust with the jurors.  “If it doesn’t fit, you must 
acquit,” Cochran’s mantra in the closing argument, was a clever empowerment-
compulsion proposal to the jury.  The mantra empowered the jury to assess all the 
evidence against Simpson to see if the evidence supported the prosecution’s theory of the 
case.  But if the evidence was defective, suggested the mantra, the jury had no option but 
to acquit the defendant.  Psychologically, Cochran forced the jury to examine the entire 
prosecution case through the lens of a courtroom scene in which the prosecution 
requested Simpson to wear the gloves in which he had presumably murdered his ex-wife.  
Millions of people, including the jurors, saw that the small gloves did not match 
Simpson’s hands.  Howard Chua-Eoan & Elizabeth Gleick, The Simpson Verdict, TIME, 
Oct. 16, 1995, at 48.  The jury acquitted Simpson, to the disappointment of many white 
Americans.  Interview by PBS Frontline with Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Director, Charles 
Hamilton Houston Inst. for Race and Justice (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/oj/interviews/ogletree.html.  Ten years later, whites and blacks are still divided 
over the jury verdict.  Id. 
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morality of the case with the morality of the lawyer acting out part of the 
story.  In artistic cultures, the negative capability becomes part of the 
culture.  Consequently, even the lay audience, including jurors, begins to 
appreciate lawyers as actors and assess their performance from a 
theatrical viewpoint, and not through rigid moral standards that jurors 
would apply to persons in real life.  Once double negative capability—
that is negative capability of performers and the audience—takes hold, 
advocacy is appreciated as an art.  Lawyers, as good actors, are applauded 
even if they are playing the role of despised villains. 
Artistic advocacy in law is not synonymous with high drama or mere 
oratory.260  It is not “putting on a show at trial.”261  A successful trial 
lawyer describes advocacy as “the art of convincing without seeming to 
be pushy, arrogant, and intolerable.”262  Undoubtedly, artistic advocacy 
involves the abilities to tell a story, make simple but effective arguments, 
and use evidence and law to obtain desired outcomes.  But skills alone 
are not enough to define artistic advocacy.  What makes artistic advocacy a 
worthwhile part of the legal system are its ethical, moral, and emotional 
dimensions.  Ethically, a good advocate prepares every aspect of the 
case—not just the oral part—with labor and care.  Morally, a good advocate 
conveys a genuine sense of honesty and courage.263  Emotionally, she 
feels the plight of her clients.  A cold-blooded technician, with no insights 
into human psychology or social justice, despite being heavily armed 
with facts and rules, is rarely a commendable or effective advocate.264 
C.  Cynical Advocacy 
While artistic advocacy may manipulate, it must not be confused with 
what one American court has called “cynical advocacy.”265  Litigants 
approach lawyers with all sorts of claims, some legitimate, some novel, 
and some frivolous.  Some claims are detrimental to the community’s 
physical, mental, and spiritual health.  Cynical advocacy believes in 
 
 260. See Celia W. Childress, An Introduction to Persuasion in the Courtroom: What 
Makes a Trial Lawyer Convincing?, 72 AM. JUR. Trials 137 (1999). 
 261. Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, Advocacy at Military Law: The Lawyer’s 
Reason and the Soldier’s Faith, 80 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1978). 
 262. Joseph D. Jamail, Advocacy and Lawyers and Their Role, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 
1157, 1161 (1995). 
 263. Id. at 1161. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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no moral values, no conception of justice, and no higher law.  It is 
anchored in true pessimism.  It rejects or ridicules “conscience [that] does 
make cowards of us all.”266  When lawyers are willing to advocate 
claims without any moral screening, cynicism permeates the adjudication 
process.  “Leave judgment for judges” is a paradigm that, in its proper 
context, frees the lawyer to argue with a determined will to obtain justice 
for the individual or the community.267  The same paradigm, in a cynical 
context, weakens the lawyer’s moral responsibility, turning him into an 
amoral bullet. 
From a religious viewpoint, any advocacy that thrives on morally bad 
laws and sacrifices communitarian good for questionable freedoms may 
be condemned as cynical advocacy.  Most religions, including Islam, for 
example, would condemn advocacy that supports hate speech against 
weak and vulnerable groups.  They would condemn advocacy for the 
protection of pornography that degrades the spiritual health of women 
and men.  They would also question advocacy for the protection of individual 
property rights that degrade the physical and spiritual environment, and 
for the protection of wealth accumulation that disdains distributive 
justice.  Even when laws are good from a religious viewpoint, cynical 
advocacy may manipulate the adjudication process to obtain undue 
advantages.  It may deliberately confuse the issues, introduce scandalous 
evidence, and promote incorrect application of laws—all as a knowing 
effort to win the case.268 
Cynical advocacy, though incompatible with religious ethos, might 
enjoy a freer space under secular ethics codes.  For example, the New 
York ethics code allows an advocate to urge “any permissible construction 
of the law favorable to [his] client.”269  But what is a permissible construction 
of law seems to belong to an uncharted realm of hermeneutics.  One 
restraint placed on advocates is that they should refrain from asserting 
frivolous positions.  A cynical lawyer with a good imagination is free 
to imagine all sorts of interpretations.  And if he has superb analytical 
skills, he can fortify his hermeneutic cynicism from charges of frivolity.  
Professor David Wilkins comes close to defining what might be called 
cynical advocacy as “argumentative nihilism in which any construction 
 
 266. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1. 
 267. Hon. George Hampel, Therapeutic Jurisprudence—An Australian Perspective, 
17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 775, 777 (2005) (stating that advocates must leave questions of 
justice to the courts but must be available to represent clients regardless of the nature of 
the case). 
 268. Magnivision, Inc., 115 F.3d at 961. 
 269. N.Y. CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (2007).  Cf. MODEL RULES OF 
PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . 
unless there is a basis [in law and fact] for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .”). 
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of the law is as good as any other and in which there are no restrictions 
on zealous advocacy.”270 
Take the Torture Memo.271  It is by no means frivolous.  It is not even 
imaginative.  But it is perhaps cynical.  Government lawyers, at least 
in the Justice Department, “should more or less always pursue justice 
rather than seeking the most that the government can get away with.”272  
The authors of the Torture Memo were not advocating in an adversarial 
context before judges.273  Their hands were free.  They were writing to 
please the client, the U.S. President, possibly to facilitate a policy that 
the client had wanted.274  As irony would have it, the declared author of 
the Torture Memo is now a federal judge. 
Cynical advocacy can also thrive under secular ethics codes that allow 
lawyers to make “good faith” arguments to extend, modify, or reverse an 
existing law.275  (No such freedom exists to change the text of the Quran, 
although its understanding is dynamic and evolutionary.)  This lawyerly 
freedom is necessary to the functioning of a fluid legal system.  Lawyers 
 
 270. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 484 
(1990). 
 271. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002).  In 2002, the Justice Department lawyers wrote a 
memorandum, signed by a Jay S. Bybee, to defend torture, in reality of Muslim men 
allegedly involved in terrorism.  This “Torture Memo” is a piece of aggressive advocacy, 
not in demeanor but substance.  The Memo stashes numerous layers of arguments to 
defend the infliction of severe physical and mental pain on suspected terrorists.  In this 
Memo, the lawyers first manufacture all possible loopholes in the federal statute that 
implements the Convention Against Torture.  But if the manufactured loopholes will not 
work, the lawyers suggest, the President may challenge the constitutionality of the statute 
for imposing impermissible constraints on his authority as Commander in Chief to gain 
intelligence information in the middle of a war.  Id. at 31.  If the unconstitutionality 
defense also fails, the lawyers then provide “justification defenses,” such as necessity 
and self defense, “that would potentially eliminate criminal liability.”  Id. at 39.  Many 
experts inside and outside the legal academy have condemned the Memo’s substantive 
zeal as contrary to the rules of professional conduct.  See, e.g., Michael Hatfield, Fear, 
Legal Indeterminacy and the American Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
511 (2006). 
 272. Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2006) (supporting partisan advocacy as a general thesis 
but making an exception for government lawyers). 
 273. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzalez, supra note 271, at 1. 
 274. Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding 
Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked 
Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 393. 
 275. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1983).  No such freedom exists to 
change the text of the Quran, although its understanding is dynamic and evolutionary. 
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cannot be just protectors of the past.  They must also be builders of the 
future.  The good faith constraint on argumentation reads well and it 
summons the lawyer’s internal honesty.  Yet, the good faith constraint is 
unable to prevent intellectual ruses.  Some codes allow advocates to 
advance opinions, without regard “to the likelihood that the construction 
will ultimately prevail.”276  This intellectual freedom may also be abused 
to defend cynical interpretations of laws. 
Cynical advocacy, though distinguishable from coercion, is closely 
related to undue influence.  Coercion compels a person to act contrary to 
his will.  A testator asked to sign a will at gunpoint is coerced.  Undue 
influence is less obvious; it nonetheless induces a state of mind for a 
person to act in a specific way.  A niece may not coerce her uncle to will 
his property to her but she may refuse to take care of him unless he does 
so.  This quid pro quo might not be considered coercion or even undue 
influence.  The law may probate the will on the bargain theory that the 
niece’s advocacy, though self-serving, benefited the uncle as well.  
However, the law may strike down the decedent’s will if the care given 
was grossly disproportionate to the property allocated in the will. 
The line between cynical advocacy and undue influence begins to blur 
when the bargain theory gathers broader respectability.277  In the United 
States, cynical advocacy has successfully invaded the legislative process.  
The rhetoric of political persuasion as the mainstay of electoral competition 
is intact.278  However, money clouds the parameters of persuasion.279  
The lobbyists use money to bargain for favorable legislation.  The laws 
have placed numerous restrictions on contributions, and they require that 
campaign finances be disclosed to the public.  Yet big loopholes exist for 
lobbyists to inject money into political campaigns, influencing elections 
as well as legislative options of elected officials.280  Summoning the 
 
 276. N.Y. CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (2007). 
 277. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53–54 (1973) 
(arguing against the “sinister explanation” that sellers use form contracts to coerce 
buyers with no choice but to accept). 
 278. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
 279. See generally Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–55, 
116 Stat. 81 (banning soft money, restricted issue ads, but increased contribution limits); 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (limiting 
the disproportionate influence of corporations and wealthy individuals). 
 280. James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional 
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 1413 (2007).  Congress has 
passed legislation to outlaw corrupt practices and corporate money from electoral 
competition.  Id. at 1466.  While campaign contributions are regulated, campaign expenditures 
are not.  The Supreme Court has struck down expenditure limitations on political campaigns, 
arguing that such limitations reduce the quantity of political speech.  This dichotomy 
between regulated contributions and unlimited expenditures invite lawyers to find 
innovative sources of money to meet expensive campaigns. 
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bargain theory of legislation, Landes and Posner argue that an independent 
judiciary must uphold the deals that lobbyists make with lawmakers.281 
VII.  TRUTH ORIENTATIONS 
Islamic law and common law part company and pursue divergent 
paths when advocacy turns to manipulation.  As discussed above, the 
two traditions support reformist advocacy.  Furthermore, both traditions 
affirm good manners and good character that advocates must cultivate to 
engage in ethical advocacy.  It would be incorrect to conclude that common 
law advocacy has lost all moral underpinnings and is moving wholesale 
toward manipulation.  Manipulative advocacy in common law is as 
unwelcome as is misinformed militancy in Islam.  It is also incorrect to 
assume that advocacy in Muslim countries has been able to rebuff 
manipulation.  The American influence over the Muslim world’s advocacy 
models world is more than perceptible.  With these caveats, this section 
analyzes truth orientations that inform and misinform advocacy. 
A.  Truth Models 
Manipulation flourishes in cultures where the people are generally 
skeptical about the notion of truth.  “Truth skepticism” arises from truth 
relativity and truth pessimism.  If a culture believes in truth relativity, 
artistic advocacy provides the competing versions of truth.  If a culture is 
pessimistic about truth because it sees the world in moral chaos driven 
by instincts and irrational forces, truth loses meaning.  In truth skeptical 
societies, the enterprise of law is severed from religion.282  Pleasing or 
displeasing God is a minor factor in advocating legal outcomes.  In such 
societies, advocacy is free from God-consciousness to pursue partisan 
agendas.  The best interests of the client, though within the bounds of 
law, guide advocacy. 
Islam is founded on the notion of al-haqq—doubtless truth.283  It 
accepts no skepticism about its moral and legal teachings.  Muslims, 
 
 281. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 894 (1975). 
 282. Note, however, that not all secular societies are truth skeptical.  Ideological 
systems, such as that of the Soviet Union, may actively abandon God and yet embrace 
the Marxist notion of historical truth.  See Ali Khan, Constitutional Kinship Between 
Iran and the Soviet Union, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293 (1988). 
 283. QURAN, sura al-Baqara 2:147. 
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therefore, adhere to the epistemology of truth.  Truth is knowable and 
communicable, although there exist areas of uncertainty.284  This truth 
orientation shapes the contours of Islamic advocacy.  The fusion of law 
and religion, however, cannot fortify against truth distortions.  A lawyer 
of faith must tell the truth as he knows it, without dilution and without 
mixing it with falsehood.  And yet he must argue the case to obtain a 
favorable result for his client.  Religious advocacy is not free of this 
tension.  However, when advocacy engages in truth distortions or truth 
suppression, it breaches the commandments of the Basic Code.  One 
may get away with truth distortions in the temporal world, even though 
the fear of disciplinary sanctions may deter lawyers from blatant 
disregard of truth.  It is unclear whether internal ethics provide more 
stringent constraints on the lawyer’s inclination to distort truth.285 
Legal systems all over the world, religious and secular, to some extent 
reject truth skepticism and furnish rules and remedies to fight truth 
distortions.  Truth distortions can occur only if there is a presumption in 
the legal system that the truth exists and is knowable.  The laws against 
perjury, for example, are designed to deter truth distortions.  The Old 
Testament forbids taking false oaths and telling lies.286  Despite the 
triumph of legal realism in the United States, the rules of criminal and 
civil procedure continue to operate on the assumption that truth is 
knowable and can be reproduced in a court of law.  A party to a dispute 
may know the facts and yet not disclose them because disclosure would 
hurt its interests.  Witnesses tell lies, hide facts, and introduce fictitious 
facts to help or hurt a party to the dispute.  The parties may harass 
witnesses from telling the truth.  They may forge documents and conceal 
written or tangible evidence and assets critical to the outcome of a case.  
These behaviors affirm the presumptive existence of knowable truth.  
Yet truth relativity has permeated some secular legal systems. 
Truth relativity287 assumes that no fixed truth exists to definitively 
measure claims and counterclaims, although a procedural mechanism 
may be put in place to assess these claims.  In litigation, for example, 
parties may sincerely view facts of the case differently.  Witnesses may 
 
 284. This is a complex area of Islamic jurisprudence and its full discussion is 
beyond the scope of this article.  For further study, see IBN RUSHD [AVERROES], KITAB 
FASL AL-MAQAL (George F. Hourani trans., Luzac & Co. 1961) (circa 1190). 
 285. See discussion infra Part VII.B. 
 286. Leviticus 6:2–7; Leviticus 19:12; Isaiah 48:1; Jeremiah 5:2; Jeremiah 7:9; 
Hosea 10:4 (New International Version). 
 287. ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY (Robert Lawson trans., Peter Smith 1959) 
(1920).  In examining the Euclidean conceptions of geometry, Einstein put the words 
truth and true in quotation marks—“truth” and “true”—to simultaneously recognize the 
conventional validity of Euclidean conceptions and to contest their validity under the 
theory of relativity.  Id. at 2, 4, 16, 149. 
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truthfully tell facts of the case in light of their own existential predicaments, 
including intellectual, spiritual, and emotional understandings of facts 
and their significance.  Opposing lawyers may interpret cases and statutes to 
argue for outcomes that best suit their clients.  These variations in narratives, 
laws, and analyses constitute truth relativity in litigation.  As such, no 
one narration or interpretation of law has a superior claim to truth.  The 
dispute is irresolvable from a truth viewpoint.  However, a procedural 
mechanism is needed to resolve these disputes.  Most legal systems 
transfer this responsibility to juries and judges.  In the United States, 
juries may be recruited to resolve the competing truths of facts, and 
judges to resolve the competing truths of laws.  These determinations of 
truth may be challenged through appellate procedures under which 
higher courts may affirm or overrule the findings of juries and lower 
courts.  In the absence of these procedural mechanisms, the truth of facts 
and laws remains an irresolvable challenge. 
The procedural mechanism to mediate competing truths does not 
guarantee that the ultimate truth would be found.  This is so because 
judges and juries, just like lawyers, parties and witnesses, evaluate 
evidence and laws through their personal preferences and professional 
experiences.  It is therefore no surprise in the domain of truth relativity if 
a jury is hung after hearing a case, or if judges in a court, including the 
highest court, are bitterly divided over the interpretation of laws.  The 
mere existence of positive law in the form of statutes and cases does not 
assure the truth of laws.  The reading of law is relative.  Lawyers and 
judges may draw different conclusions from the same section of a statute 
and construct diverse meanings from the holding of the same case. 
Truth relativity supports artistic advocacy.  If both facts and laws are 
relative in the domain of truth, artistic advocacy highlights different 
versions and nuances of the same case.  Now, litigation is theater.  
Lawyers, parties, and witnesses are stage actors; judges, juries, and the 
public inside or outside the courtroom constitute the audience.  Juries 
and judges respond to artistic advocacy in the same way, just as an 
audience in a theater, including professional critics, responds in a myriad 
of ways to the unfolding of the same play.  Some in the audience pay 
attention to each line of the play, some miss huge portions of the play, 
some powerfully relate to a particular character, some are bored, and 
some simply lack the requisite life experiences to comprehend nuances 
of life on the stage.  Responses in the courtroom are no different than 
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ones in the theater.  A thousand plays come into being from the staging 
of the same play.288 
This American legal realism does not evaporate in religious societies, 
which must also come to terms with the human factor in the interpretations 
of sacred texts.  Ian Mitroff has argued that even in physical sciences, 
great minds are not objective truth finders but advocates of hypotheses.289  
The commonplace paradigm that science is objective and that personal 
bias has no room in scientific research is a myth, says Mitroff, 
particularly with respect to grand scientific ideas.  A great scientist discovers a 
hypothesis and collects evidence to support it.  Once credible—though 
not irrefutable—evidence has been collected, the scientist presents his 
hypothesis and begins to persuade other scientists about its truth.  He 
may subtly modify his hypothesis to absorb conflicting evidence.  Only 
when the evidence contrary to the hypothesis is immense may the 
scientist abandon the hypothesis.  Since peers are under no obligation to 
accept the hypothesis and may have their own competing hypotheses, 
the marketplace of ideas eventually sorts out which of the competing 
hypotheses is creditworthy. 
Feyerabend proposes the principle of tenacity under which the 
scientist continues to defend his theory despite the gathering opposition 
to it.290  The principle of tenacity warns against premature abandonment 
of a theory that carries the elements of truth but lacks the irrefutable 
evidence.  Crude theories in their formative stages are truer in the minds 
of their discoverers even when they might make little sense to others.  
“Abandonment of an idea too soon is much worse than wasting time and 
effort on a [seemingly] worthless supposition.  Science, especially the 
social sciences, needs this kind of tenacity.”291 
 
 288. Ali Khan, Learning Legal Reasoning, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 265, 265–67 (1991) 
(reviewing JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING (rev. ed. 1987)) (describing 
law as art).  Artistic advocacy in law may be compared with sculpturing or painting.  The 
outcome of a case is a shared work of art.  It is the handiwork of multiple artists, including 
lawyers, lawmakers, law commentators, judicial clerks, and judges.  The advocate on 
each side vigorously contributes to influence the effects of the final outcome.  No one 
advocate enjoys a free hand, not even in ex-parte cases, to draw the outcome with 
unhindered artistic will.  In contested cases, numerous restraints are placed on both 
advocates and advocacy.  Nonetheless, a successful advocate is one whose version 
of facts and law succeeds in shaping the final outcome. 
 289. Ian I. Mitroff, The Myth of Objectivity or Why Science Needs a New Psychology of 
Science, 18 MGMT. SCI. B-613, B-614–16 (1972). 
 290. Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 197, 205 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). 
 291. John L. Cotton, Objective Versus Advocacy Models of Scientific Enterprise: A 
Comment on the Mitroff Myth, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 133, 134 (1982) (arguing advocacy 
is useful in researching science but the results must be objectively reported). 
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The common law adversarial system accommodates truth relativity, 
artistic advocacy, and the principle of tenacity.  John Rawls anchors the 
ethics of advocacy in liberal political theory.292  Building on the works 
of John Rawls and John Stuart Mill, Susan Carle argues that litigation 
should be available to poor clients as much as it is to more advantaged 
members of society.293  She also argues that litigation should be considered 
as a marketplace of ideas.  To promote justice consistent with the concept of 
liberal political theory, client-centered advocacy is most needed.294  
When the truth is relative, client-centered advocacy provides the ultimate 
tool to mediate competing claims of righteousness.  Competing claims 
are irresolvable and therefore the advocate who makes the best case 
receives the award.295  Another rationale for client-centered advocacy 
may be founded on the assumption that parties distort truth to receive a 
better deal from the legal system.  Therefore, the system must allow vigorous 
advocacy to neutralize distortions. 
Truth skepticism grants no license to engage in truth distortions or 
manipulation.  Truth-relativity is not devoid of ethics.  It does not sanction 
lies.  It simply refuses to embrace the philosophical notion of fixed truths.  
By believing in no fixed truths, the people do not lose cognitive faculties 
to distinguish between night and day.  When a rude notion of truth relativity 
permeates a culture, however, the less sophisticated minds begin to 
confuse truth relativity with untruth.  A highly skeptical society may 
suffer from a moral breakdown.296  Parties and witnesses may engage in 
falsehood, believing that there exists no truth and that the other party 
will engage in similar behavior.  If truth is relative, some may boldly 
conclude that everything goes.  This disrespect for truth, nonetheless, is 
not the intended but the unfortunate consequence of truth skepticism. 
 
 292. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 91 (1999). 
 293. Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 140–43 (2006). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 140. 
 296. See Norman R. Phillips, The Conservative Implications of Skepticism, 18 J. 
POL. 28, 33 (1956).  If there is no one truth, parties and witnesses may not be accused of 
truth distortions.  Parties are therefore allowed to plead their respective versions of facts 
and laws.  Witnesses may tell what they know, mixing facts with fiction.  They may be 
accused of perjury, however, if the mixing is deliberate.  The opposing counsels may 
engage in artistic advocacy to tell their own truth of law and to contest the truth of the 
other side.  Each side may accuse the other of truth distortions.  Yet each side holds on to 
its respective theory of the case. 
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B.  Revulsions 
Since its inception in the seventh century, Islamic law has been 
skeptical of manipulative advocacy.  Malik Ibn Anas (715–796), one of 
the four founding jurists of Islamic law, reports that two persons stood 
up and spoke with great eloquence.  The people were stunned to hear their 
speeches.  When this event was narrated to the Prophet, he said: “Part of 
eloquence is sorcery.”297  At another occasion, the Prophet furnished the 
example of an eloquent person who charms the people by his speech and 
takes away a right that belongs to a less eloquent person.298  This skepticism 
of eloquence expressed in the Prophet’s Sunna is consistent with the 
Quran’s commandments that argumentation must be most gracious.299  
Thus, under the combined force of the Quran and the Sunna (the Basic 
Code), advocacy to defend claims, interests, and viewpoints must neither 
be harsh, nor sorcerous, because harsh advocacy is insulting and sorcerous 
advocacy is deceptive.300  Truthful presentation of evidence and respectful 
delivery of supportive arguments, without employing overreaching 
eloquence, are the prescriptive norms of advocacy under Islamic law.  
The most hated person in the sight of God is the most quarrelsome 
person. 
Once the Prophet said, “You people present your cases to me and 
some of you may be more eloquent and persuasive in presenting their 
argument.  So, if I give some one’s right to another (wrongly) because of 
the latter’s (tricky) presentation of the case, I am really giving him a 
piece of fire; so he should not take it.”301 
This hadith clarifies three important points.  First, it recognizes advocacy 
as a supportive mechanism for the protection of one’s rights.  One may 
lawfully draw on persuasion to argue one’s case and to support claims.  
Second, it recognizes that judges may reach wrong results under the spell 
of advocacy.  The Prophet did not even exempt himself from committing 
such an error.  Third, and perhaps the most important, the hadith places 
an obligation on the winner of a lawsuit not to accept the “undeserved 
fruits” of his advocacy. 
 
 297. IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS, supra note 194, bk. 56, Ch. 578, No. 56.3.7.  John 
Milton captures this idea in the following lines: “So much of adder’s wisdom I have 
learned, To fence my ear against thy sorceries.”  4 JOHN MILTON, Samson Agonistes 
1667–1671, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF JOHN MILTON 414, 438 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 
Harvard Classics 1959) (1671). 
 298. ABU DAWUD, supra note 157, Kitab al-Adab bk. 36, No. 4994, at 1394; 3 
SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 54, Kitab al-Salat bk. 41, No. 494, at 495–96. 
 299. QURAN sura an-Nahl 16:125. 
 300. ABU DAWUD, supra note 157, Kitab al-Adab bk. 41, No. 4994, at 1394. 
 301. 3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 49, § 48:845, at 521. 
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The hadith does not prohibit the use of advocacy.  It fortifies advocacy 
with responsibility.  In dispute resolution processes, including litigation, 
one may lawfully employ persuasion to make legitimate claims.  However, 
responsible advocacy does not ask for more than its share.  It is not predatory, 
exploitative, or acquisitive.  Accordingly, judges must be aware of the 
pitfalls of eloquent presentations and ask themselves if they have been 
prejudiced by a party’s powerful presentation.  This skepticism of advocacy 
puts judges on guard. 
Most people, including judges and juries in secular and religious systems, 
wish to be informed.  They rarely volunteer to be manipulated—particularly 
by persons who they believe are less informed or intellectually inferior to 
them.  The concept of “hard sell” captures the annoyance of ordinary 
consumers.  The example of a car dealer determined to sell a vehicle 
to a consumer who walks into the showroom is described as a hard sell.  
Marketing scientists note that hard selling is aggressive marketing 
that overstates a product’s merits, its bargain value, and creates a false 
sense of urgency to pressure consumers to not only buy the product but 
also the high margin add-on features.302  Most consumers view hard 
selling more annoying than beneficial.303  Ironically, though, hard sells 
create financial loss for consumers who avoid hard sellers and end up 
paying more for products elsewhere.304  Thus, hard selling may injure both 
the hard seller and the consumer as both lose each other for profitable 
exchanges. 
Judges may have a soft corner for gentle and artistic persuasion but 
most would detest cynical advocacy that sells injustice.  They may be 
skeptical of truth but they can smell lies and are repulsed.  They understand 
manipulation and know “[t]hat one may smile, and smile, and be a 
villain.”305  Revulsions against manipulation are universal.  Honest, 
decent, and courageous attorneys at peace with their internal ethics, 
“cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, [and] employ 
that knowledge in reform of the law.”306 
 
 302. Wujin Chu, Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, Cost and Benefits of Hard-Sell, 
32 J. MARKETING RES. 97, 97 (1995). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5. 
 306. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. 5 (1983). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Reformist advocacy is part of Islamic and common law traditions.  In 
both traditions, however, reformist advocacy has lost its way.  In the 
United States, advocacy has turned to manipulation whereas Islamic 
advocacy has embraced militancy.  These developments will fail to 
undermine these two great traditions of law, which have been in close 
contacts for centuries and continue to engage each other.  Honest and 
courageous advocacy derived from profound knowledge of law and 
religion will reject militancy and manipulation as possible options to 
forge honorable exchanges between Islam and common law. 
 
